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ABSTRACT

As reflected by the literature, the environment of each country
influences the characteristics of the budgetary process in that country.
Often-cited factors which shape this environment are:

economic wealth,

financial predictability, political institutions, elite values, and
size.

Economic wealth and financial predictability are considered the

most powerful.
Economic wealth and financial predictability permit four classi
fications of budgetary environments, namely:

rich and certain, poor and

certain, poor and uncertain, and rich and uncertain environments.

Each

of the first three classes of budgetary environments has been investi
gated in the existing literature.

However, the rich and uncertain

environment remains more elusive to the investigator.
This author believes that a government exists with sufficient
wealth and environmental uncertainty to be classified in the fourth
category.

Namely, such government exists in Saudi Arabia.

Therefore,

the purpose of this study was to examine empirically the characteristics
of the governmental budgetary process in which the environment is uncer
tain but where the government is rich.
A combination of different research methods were used to gather
the data for this study. This combination included library research,
interviews, and empirical testing of the quantitative budgetary data.
The findings, based on both research tools, are summarized as
follows:
ix

(1)

Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process can be characterized

as a non-incremental process. Specifically, the interview results show
ed that complexity in calculations was a common attribute throughout the
budgetary process.

This complexity led most cf the government agencies

to either over- or underestimate their requests, thus compelling the
Ministry of Finance to review the entire agency's requests instead of
concentrating on the changes or the increments from the previous year's
appropriation.

The evidence from the quantitative budgetary data also

supported this conclusion.

The magnitude of changes in budgetary allo

cations and actual expenditures for most of the cases studied were in
the range of "non-incremental" process.
(2)

Supplemental budgeting was one of the major attributes of the

Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process.
(3)

Lack of qualified personnel, lack of well defined decision cri

teria, and the absence of modern data gathering techniques were observed
through the budgetary process.
(4)

The budgetary participants showed a high level of strategizing.

Spending agencies tend to exaggerate their estimates knowing that the
Ministry of Finance would alter these estimates.
(5)

The spending agencies and the Ministry of Finance played major

roles in the budgetary decisions.

However, the Ministry of Finance

seemed to influence those decisions more than did the individual agen
cies.

In particular, the majority of the agencies' budget directors

viewed their role as "coordinator" among the agencies' departments in
the formulation of both the agencies plans and annual requests as more
than "decision maker."

In contrast, the role of the senior staff of

x
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the Ministry of Finance budget department could be viewed as "cutter"
more than "efficiency economizer."
The quantitative budgetary data seemed to support the interviews
results, concerning the relationships between the budgetary partici
pants.

Significant positive correlations were found between budget

expansion and both agency acquisitiveness and ministry of Finance sup
port.

The correlations between budget expansion and Ministry of

Finance support was stronger than the correlations between budget
expansion and agency acquisitiveness.

Moreover, there were no signifi

cant correlations among budget expansion and estimated revenue expan
sion, actual revenue expansion, and spending efficiency.

Since the

Ministry of Planning has a major influence on agency acquisitiveness,
the simple correlation indicated that these three organizations effected
the final budgetary output.

However, the multiple regressions analysis

showed that the Ministry of Finance support was the most dominant
>.<*L
independent variable that explained most of the variation in budget
expansion.

xi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

Governmental budgeting involves processing a complex series of
social and political factors.

Those who create budgets assume that a

direct link will exist between the users of the funds as enumerated in
the budget and future events. Hence, the budget might be conceived of
as a model of intended behavior:

a prediction.

The budget thus becomes

a means of integrating financial resources and human behavior to
accomplish policy objectives.
The governmental budgetary process throughout the world evokes
theoretical and empirical questions such as:

Theoretically, what

behavioral and organizational theory(s) might explain the budgetary
process?
cess?

Empirically, what are the major characteristics of the pro

How do the process participants formulate the budget?

And what

roles and strategies will f.hey assume?
Government budgets result from a plan of action in which differ
ent groups play different roles according to each group's position
within the organization. This notion suggests the plausibility of
adopting the theory of Role Behavior which the behaviorists define as:
...."The recurring actions of an individual,
appropriately interrelated with the repetitive
activities of others so as to yield a predict
able outcome. The set of independent behaviors
comprises a social system or subsystems....or

a stable collective pattern in which people
play their parts."I
The role behavior theory provides a theoretical foundation from
which to explain and to predict the behavior of the participants in
governmental budgetary processes.

On the basis of the role behavior

theory, Wildavsky postulated a general pattern of behavior in govern
mental budgetary process no matter where it is practiced.
pattern of behavior consists of:
(1)

This general

2

General Strategic Behavior
Strategic behavior refers to the methods which the major budget

ary participants utilize to get their ways.

Apart from environmental

or political differences, any governmental budgetary process includes
two groups or participants:
(a) The administrative agencies advocate increased expenditures
and object budget to cut, or at least struggle to maintain the
budget base.

Since any administrative agency struggles to have

more money in order to survive j?,rjd expand, this pattern of
behavior exists in any budgetary environment.
(b) The central control organs act as guardians of the public
treasury.

Since these groups know that the administrative

agencies will continue to press for increased expenditures and
that government sources are limited, they cut and trim in order
to keep spending within boundaries of revenues.

This general

"4). KatZ' and P. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organization
(New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 174.
2
Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting; A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), pp. 5-9.

3
pattern of behavior is widespread in any environment.
(2)

The Degree of Complexity in the Calculations
Complexity exists in any governmental budgetary process, and

budget participants in any environment adapt what is referred to as
"aids to calculations" in order to overcome this complexity.

They

simplify decision making by proceeding from a historical base in order
to concentrate on proposed new increments.

Also, padding, across the

board cuts, and increasing spending at the end of the year are general
patterns of behavior in any governmental budgetary process.

3

Wildavsky pointed out that the environment of each country
influences the characteristics of budgetary process in that country and
hence, alters the behavior of the major participants in that process
from the general pattern.
environment are:

The most important factors which shape this

political institutions, size, elite values, economic

4
wealth, and financial predictability.
Although the differences in sizes, political institutions, and
elite values among countries might alter the behavior of budgetary
participants, these differences are considered relatively small in
comparison with the effect of economic wealth and financial predict
ability. In this context, Wildavsky argued that the combination of
economic wealth and financial predictability control all other variables.
This argument is based on the assumption that wealth and predictability,
as well as poverty and uncertainty, homogenize behavior."*

3
Ibid., p. 9.
A

lbid., p. 10.

5Ibid.,

p. 11.

For example,

4
there are common budgetary characteristics in the United Kingdom and
in the United States, even though these two countries differ in their
size, in their political institutions, and in their elite values.

On

the other hand, there are sharp differences in the characteristics of
the budgetary processes in the United States and in India.
In another example, Wildavsky argued that the characteristics
of the budget process in the Soviet Union at macro level are similar
to those in rich, Western nations even though there are extremely sharp
differences in their political institutions. He based this argument on
the fact that wealth and predictability determine the main features of
the budgetary process in the Soviet Union and in other Western
6
nations.

This assertion does not mean that the budgetary processes

are identical in the same environment.

As a matter of fact, when com

paring the budgetary processes of nations having the same degree of
economic wealth and financial predictability, one finds that differences
in size, political institutions, and elite values have a major effect.
So, economic wealth and financial predictability are considered the
most powerful variables only for the purpose of comparing the charac
teristics of budgetary process in different budgetary environments.
Economic wealth refers to the availability of resources with
which to finance the budgetary goals.

Rich countries are those with

economic wealth sufficient to finance needed programs.

Poor countries

have precisely the opposite conditions.^ Financial predictability refers to the ability to anticipate

^Ibid., p. 18.
^Ibid., p. 10.

flows of available resources in relation to spending commitments.
Certain countries have the ability to calculate the flow of expendi
tures and revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to project them
into the near future.

Uncertain nations have precisely the opposite

8
conditions.
In order to draw a line between rich and poor, and certain and
uncertain countries, one must define operationally the economic wealth
and financial predictability factors.

The per capita gross national

product has been used in economics as a leading indicator of the degree
of economic wealth in a given nation. So, a poor country is simply one
with a per capita gross national product that is low relative to the
present-day per capita national product of such nations as the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the nations of most of Western Europe.
Thus, economic wealth is a relative concept, and in order to define a
given country as rich or poor, this country's per capita must be com
pared with a pre-determined scale for rich and poor countries.
Wildavsky defined poor countries as those with per capita income of
9

less than $900.00.

Trying to distinguish between certain and uncertain budgetary
environments is also difficult because of uncertain world conditions,
and there is no pure budgetary system where future revenues and/or
expenditures are consistently and accurately forecasted.

But, in

general, the certain budgetary environments are those where future
revenues and/or expenditures are projected with a high probability of
Q

Ibid., p. 10.
9Ibid.,

136.

6
occurrence.

The uncertain budgetary environments are those where

future revenues and/or expenditures are projected with a low proba
bility of occurrence.

A given high and low probability of occurrence

is a relative concept, and in order to determine whether a given
budgetary environment is certain or uncertain, one must compare the
forecasting ability of the system to project the revenues and/or
expenditures with a predetermined certain environment, such as the
United States.

The uncertain budgetary environments have common

attributes, such as lack of sufficient information, lack of educated
and trained personnel, lack of political stability, lack of diversi
fication of sources of revenues, and lack of administrative capa
bility.10
Under this wealth and predictability model, four categories of
budgeting environments can occur:
1.

Rich and certain environments (RCE)

2.

Poor and certain environments (PCE)

3.

Poor and uncertain environments (PUE)

4.

Rich and uncertain environments (RUE)

The existing theoretical and empirical research in the govern
mental budgetary process concludes that each budgetary environment has

11

common characteristics.

RCE refers to a budgetary system which has

the ability to mobilize sufficient resources or to control expenditures,
or both, and which has the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures
or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to project them into

10Ibid.,

p. 138.

11Ibid.,

pp. 9-12.

the near future.

The budgetary processes in the United States, the

United Kingdom, France, Germany and other Western nations are examples
of this budgetary environment.

According to Wildavsky, the budgetary

process in these countries classified as rich and certain is
incremental. Past decisions serve as bases from which future expen
ditures are determined, and the budgetary processes are concerned with
adding or subtracting a small percentage (increment) to or from the
existing base.
PCE refers to a budgetary system which is unable to mobilize
sufficient resources, but which has the ability to calculate the flow
of expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to
project them into the near future.

The budgetary process in most

American city governments is the best example of this budgetary envi
ronment.

Most American cities are in a poor resource position, but

they have sufficient financial predictability.

The budgetary process

in this environment becomes a whole revenue control - orientation due
to the poor resource position.

City officials are aware of the needs

of the city, but they must compromise their needs considerably in the
fact of limited resources.

So, the budgeting process in the poor and

certain environment is revenue oriented because income determines
expenditures.
PUE refers to a budgetary system which is unable to mobilize
sufficient resources (because of the lack of resources) or to control
expenditures, or both, and which is unable to calculate the flow of
expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to project
them into the near future.

The budgetary process in India, Pakistan,

8
Egypt, and other poor countries is an example of this budgetary
environment.

The poor and uncertain nations employ a budgetary process

of repetition. Poverty leads them to delay expenditures to insure that
their financial resources are not depleted, whereas uncertainty causes
them to reprogram funds repeatedly in order to adjust to rapidly
changing conditions.

So, the budgetary process in poor and uncertain

environments can be characterized as repetitive budgeting.
Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics of the budgetary process
12
of the three classes.

Figure 1.
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However, the fourth class, those countries with rich and
uncertain environments, remains

more elusive to the investigator.

As one authority on governemtnal budgeting states:

12
Adapted from Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of
Budgetary Process, p. 13.

"Budgetary processes falling in the rich and
uncertain box will not be discussed....because I
have not been able to find accounts of comtemporary
governments with those characteristics."13
This author contends that a government exists with sufficient
wealth and environmental uncertainty to be classified in the fourth
category.

Namely, such a government exists in Saudi Arabia, where the

oil revenues available to the government are abundant, but the predict
ability of future funds is uncertain. Saudi Arabia does not possess
the productive factors of manufacturing, agriculture, and banking
which make the United States, the United Kingdom, and France wealthy
countries.

However, Saudi Arabia has a high current income, which

categorizes it as a wealthy nation.
mainly from one source, namely:

But this wealth is generated

the oil industry. So, Saudi Arabia

possesses the financial resources (per capita income of $15,700), but
does not have the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures in the
immediate past nor to project them into the near future.

Therefore,the

characteristics of the budgetary process in Saudi Arabia differ from
those in poor countries (those without money) and in rich countries
which are certain about their budgets.
The purpose of the study is to examine empirically the character
istics of the governmental budgeting process in which the environment
is uncertain but where the government is rich.

13Ibid.,

p. 11.

10
Statement of the Problem

What are the characteristics of the governmental budgeting
process when the government is rich

but

the environment is uncertain?

To facilitate the investigation of this question, the study is organ
ized into the following four phases.
Phase I
The existing theoretical explanations of the governmental
budgetary process in any country regardless of the existing environ
ment within that country are examined.
Phase II
Those empirical works are reviewed that deal with the character
istics of budgetary processes in the first three classes of budgetary
environments, namely:

RCE, PCE and PUE.

Phase III
The characteristics of the budgetary process in rich and uncer
tain environment are examined empirically.

This phase involves the

following stages:
Stage 1
A description and analysis of the role of the major parti
cipants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process;
Stage 2
An empirical examination of the characteristics of Saudi
Arabian governmental budgetary process;
Stage 3
The development of preliminary recommendations for the

11
improvement of the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process.
Phase IV
The characteristics of the budgetary processes in rich and
uncertain environment are compared with the other three classes of
budgetary environments.
As shown in Figure 2, some of these phases have been investi
gated by previous researchers.

Others will be examined by this study.

Justifications and Contributions
of the Study

The last decade has witnessed an increasing interest in the
accounting for not-for-profit (NFP) organizations.

The American

Accounting Association (AAA), through its difference committees, has
issued several reports related to NFP accounting theory.

The American

Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), through the Finan
cial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and the Auditing Committees, has
issued sundry NFP accounting and auditing guides.

Furthermore, FASB,

with the cooperation of the National Committee on Governmental Account
ing, has moved toward establishing pragmatic accounting standards for
14
NFP organizations.

In spite of the developments in the last decade,

14
For examples, please see: Committee on Accounting for Not-ForProfit Organizations, The Accounting Review (Supplement to Vol. 46
(1971), pp. 81-164; Committee on Nonfinancial Measures of Effective
ness, The Accounting Review (Supplement to Vol. 46 (1971), pp. 165-212;
Committee on Measures of Effect for Social Programs, The Accounting
Review (Supplement to Vol. 47 (1972), pp. 337-398; Committee on Not-ForProfit Organizations (1972-1973), The Accounting Review (Supplement to
Vol. 49 (1974), pp. 225-249; Robert A. Anthony, Financial Accounting in
Nonbusiness Organizations: An Exploratory Study of Conceptual Issues,
May 1978.

Figure 2.
Illustration of the Four
Phases of the Study
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Arabia
Stage 2
Examine empirically the characteris
tics of Saudi Arabian governmental
budgetary processes
Stage 3
Evolve preliminary recommendations to
improve the Saudi Arabian governmental
budgetary processes

13
the accounting for NFP organizations is still a neglected area in
accounting literature.
Accounting for NFP organizations could be categorized as
"business-type" or "government-type."

The activities of these types

have been defined by AAA Committee on Accounting for not-for-profit
organizations as:
"Business type activities are those that are
intended to be self-supporting (or largely so)
through time. Though the capital required to
establish or expand such activities may be pro
vided in various manners; e.g., by donation,
grant, general debt issue, or intraunit transfer their routine operations, at least are financed
through consumer or user charges
governmenttype activities are those typically associated
with the "general government" or other not-forprofit purposes and objectives of the unit."-^
The Accounting for Business type is more fully developed than the gov
ernment type.

This phenomonen could be attributable to the resemblance

of the business type to profit-oriented organizations.

Traditionally,

budgets or budgeting has been investigated in accounting literature
within the business environment.

This practice could be based on the

assumption that generalizations about budgeting can be formulated to
apply to both public and private spheres.

Dahl and Lindblom have main

tained the position that there is a continuum or continuums between
16

public and private agencies.

This study takes the position that

budgeting in the governmental sphere should be studied separately for

"'"^Committee on Accounting for Not-For-Profit Organizations (19721973), p. 225.
"^Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics,
and Welfare (N.Y.: Harper and Bros., 1953), pp. 6-18.

14
the following reasons:
First, the environment of the business would contain elements
that have no counterparts in the environment of most public sectors.
Second, the pervasive notion in the existing literature is that
budgeting or budgets play a greater role in the public sphere than in
the private sphere.

This notion is attributable to the nature of

government environment.

The amount of resources available for govern

ment is bound only by the sum of all resources in the society.

On the

other hand, the private sector is constrained by a relatively fixed set
of available resources.

Also, private sector activities are character

ized by the profit motive, while government activities are not.

There

fore, governmental budgets have become a method to communicate govern
ment endeavors to all citizens.
Third, understanding the governmental budget is essential to
government accountants in order to provide public administrators with
^the relevant information for decision making.

This point could be

illustrated by Ball's recent article on government accounting:
"....The government accountant is providing infor
mation for public administrators within a political
context. Adequate functioning in this area pre
supposes a knowledge of the conduct of public
administration and some understanding of political
behavior. There is, for instance, a substantial
body of literature explaining the behavior of
various groups within the budgetary process in
government. This examines alternative strategies
adapted by departments and the response of the
Treasury and of the Government. If an accountant
is to be involved in the budgetary process in
government, such knowledge would seem to be
essential to him as is literature which examines

15
the mentioned aspects of standard-setting in
the private sector.
Fourth, budgetary practices are clearly accounting and must be
performed by the profession; otherwise the quality and credibility of
18
thie data accumulated, analyzed,and used suffer.
The study of governmental budgeting is a study in behavioral and
governmental accounting.

The economy of a country is greatly influenced

by the budgetary actions of that country's government.

Governmental

budgeting is the major process through which the planning and control
ling of public resources are determined.

Comprehensive planning provides

guidance for the allocation of economic resources.

Budgetary activity

enables the plan for the public sector to be directly implemented, while
through a system of incentives and disincentives, budgetary activities
indirectly influence private consumption, savings, and investments.
Written budget proposals are essential to communications, discussions,
revisions, and documentation of plans by those concerned with and
responsible for the planning.
used as a control device.

Also, governmental budgeting is widely

The budget enables the departments and chief

executives to keep the expenditures within the limitations imposed by
the Legislatures.

Finally, the budget is used for the purpose of the

19
evaluation of the effectiveness of governmental programs.

The first

"^Lan Ball, "Government Accounting," Accountants Journal, February
1979, pp. 12-14.
18
David F. Linowes, "Social Responsibility of the Profession,"
The Journal of Accountancy, January 1971, pp. 66-69.
19
Edward Lynn, and Robert Freeman, Fund Accounting Theory and
Practice (Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972),
p. 59.
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step in fulfilling these functions is to understand the budgetary
process itself and to apply its characteristics in order to make it
function effectively.
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the charac
teristics of the budgetary process in rich and uncertain environments
and to compare the characteristics of this process with those of the
other three classes, the results of this study should contribute toward
constructing a theory of governmental budgeting.

Moreover, it is hoped

that this study will fill a gap in the literature of governmental
accounting.
Because of the continuous and rapid increase in Saudi Arabian
governmental activities, the decision-making process has become very
complex.

Consequently, relevant information is more essential now than

ever before for anticipating the most desirable results of any decision.
Such information is not generated by the traditional Saudi Arabian
budgetary process.

20

So, an auxiliary contribution of this study is to

evolve recommendations which may help in improving the governmental
budgetary process in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the results of this
study will be useful to accounting practitioners and educators in rich
and uncertain countries in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular.

Limitations of the Study

Although the purpose of this study is to investigate the charac
teristics of the governmental budgetary processes in rich and uncertain
20
M. Amry, Program Budgeting Model for Saudi Arabian Elementary
Education: An Emphasis on Program Costs. (Unpublished Ph.D. Disserta
tion, The Accounting Department, University of Arizona, 1976), p. 4.
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environments, the study will be limited to the Saudi Arabian govern
mental budgetary process.

The reason for this limitation is because

of the unavailability of data except for data available from the
records of the Saudi Arabian government.
This study will be limited to the opinions of those interviewed
in the study sample, the various budget participants.

The study was

made possible through the cooperation of the Ministry of Finance and
other government organizations of the Saudi Arabian government.

Scope and Organization of the Study

This study contains five chapters - Introduction, Literature
Review, Methodology, Results, Summary and Conclusion.

The first

chapter - The Introduction - includes the purpose of the study, the
statement of the problem, the justification and the contributions of
the study, limitations of the study, and the organization of the study.
In order to furnish a background for this study, the second
chapter provides a review of the related literature. In particular,
this chapter discusses the theory that explains the governmental
budgetary process in any country regardless of the existing environ
ment within that country, summarizes the major budgetary reforms in
governmental budgetary process with emphasis on the rich and certain
environments, and reviews the major empirical contributions in the
three classes of budgetary process.
The third chapter states the research hypotheses and outlines the
methodology.

The fourth chapter details the empirical research.

The

Summary, conclusions, and recommendations are stated in the final chapter.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Governmental Budgetary Process:

Historical Development

The main objectives of reviewing the historical development of
the governmental budget are twofold:
1.

To provide the accounting profession and academia with a

synopsis review of the recent development in governmental "budgetary
process with emphasis on the major reforms in rich and certain
environments.
2.

To compare the governmental budgetary reforms in Saudi Arabia

with other reforms in othet countries as well as to furnish a basis
for the study recommendations.
A substantial part of governmental budget literature is con
cerned with reforms.

The need for better budgeting is the princiapl

reason for this concentration.

Governmental budget reforms in the

United States of America - resembling RCE have passed through three
different stages of development:
and planning-oriented.

control-oriented, management-oriented,

In the first stage, dating roughly from 1920-

1935, the dominant emphasis was on accountability.

In the second

stage, dating roughly between the 1930's and the 1960's, the emphasis
was on efficiency in the government.

The final stage, which occured

during the 60's and 70's, emphasized the multipurpose budget system.

18

19
(1)

The Era of Fiscal Control (Input Cost)
Traditionally, governmental budgeting all over the world begins

with indispensable efforts to promote "accountability" by emphasizing
the control over

administrative spending abuses.

In other words, the

budget has been considered primarily a financial and accounting device,
in which input cost is the major feature of the budget.

The means of

achieving tight control over input costs was to appropriate by line item,
or object of expenditure,rather than upon the accomplishments of govern
mental activities."'"
A unified national budget was the first major reform in this
era.

In the United States, the first decade of the twentieth century

witnessed the struggle to establish a unified national budget.

Up to

that time, the United States budget was simply a compilation of depart
mental requests for funds.

Most writers credited the changes in eco

nomic conditions for this reform.

Others believe that the success of

local governmental experiences with a unified budget, such as in New
York and Ohio, was the major factor for prompting the national unified
budget idea.

The Taft Commission (1912) recommended the need for a

national budget, but it was not until the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 that the new federal system was established.

This system involves

establishing a national unified budget with new forms of auditing and
control.

2

Also, the system involves a standard periodic budget cycle.

The unified national budget was also the major reform in other countries.
"'"Bertram M. Gross, "The New Systems Budgeting," Public Administra
tion Review (March/April, 1969), p. 117.
2
Robert D. Lee and Ronald W. Johnson, Public Budgeting System
(Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975), p. 8.
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For example, the English Consolidated Fund Act of 1787 established a
complete account of revenue and expenditure. In France, the budgetary
3

system was established in 1831.

The second major reform in this era was the "balanced budget,"
Balanced budget was considered to be the core principle in good fiscal
policy.

Gross stated that the reason for this belief is that it

provides a "hard-nosed" criterion for decision making by budget
4
rationalists.
The other reforms in this era can be categorized as additions
to the financial audit activities and to the centralization of budget
preparation.

Those reforms were used to insure that money had in fact

been spent for the item authorized in the budget.
Theoretically, the majority of the writers in the early part of
this century criticized the budgetary system which focuses on input
cost.

They regarded input cost as subsidiary data, to be included for

informational purposes only.

Instead, they promoted the budgetary

system which is based on functional classifications.

This system would

focus on the work to be accomplished.The Taft Commission in Economy
and Efficiency (1912) is the best example of a proponent of the func
tional classification system which focuses on program results instead of
fiscal control. Other examples of the proponents of program results
can be seen in the writings of Fredrick A. Cleveland (1910), Paul T.
3

Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York:

Wiley, 1965),

p. 7.
^Bertram M. Gross, "The New System Budgeting, p. 118.
Allen Walker Steiss, Budgeting and Management (Lexington:
Massachusetts, Lexington, 1972), p. 150.
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Besser (1915), William F. Willoughby (1918), and Lent D, Upson (1924).^
According to Steiss, most of the early efforts to develop func
tional classification were relatively unsuccessful.

The reason for

their failure was that functional classification did not provide
adequate protection against administrative improprieties.^
(2)

The Management Orientation (Input related to Output)
The second stage of budget reforms was initiated to affect the

problems of fiscal control reforms.
management orientation.

This stage is characterized as

The major emphasis was on the efficiency with

which ongoing activities were conducted.

In other words, this stage

was concerned with efficiency instead of fiscal control in the govern
ment.

According to Gross, the idea behind this movement was that any

government agency should know what it has done, is doing, or wants to
do with the inputs it uses.^
In the United States, the management orientation stage was
officially inaugurated by the 1949 Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, known as the First Hoover Commission.
The Commission recommended that the federal budget be "based upon
function, activities, and projects." This recommendation is best known
as "performance budget."

The Commission report stated:

"....We recommend that the whole budgetary concept
of the federal government should be refashioned by
the adoption of a budget based upon functions, activ
ities, and projects; this we designate a performance
budget. Such an approach would focus attention upon
g
Lee and Johnson, Public Budgeting System, p. 103.
^Steiss, Budgeting and Management, p. 151.
O
Gross, "The New System Budgeting," p. 119.
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the general character and relative importance
of the work to be done, or upon the service
to be rendered, rather than upon the things to
be acquired, such as personal services, supplies,
equipment, etc. These latter objects are, after
all, only the means to an end. The all important
thing in budgeting is the work or the service to
be accomplished, and what the work or service
will cost."9
Although performance budget had numerous theoretical appeals,
practically it faced numerous problems.

And by the early sixties, the

performance budget movement had begun to slow down.

Some authors

believe that performance budget failed because it required a large
amount of data without establishing an adequate information system.
Others

attribute its failure to the negligence of middle managment.

Gross attributed the failure of performance budget to the following
10
reasons:
(a) The Hoover Commission failed to recognize the greater ease
of output, identification, measurement, and costing in programs
associated with hard goods.
(b) Governmental budget areas failed to focus on the problem
of intangible output.
(c) Costing was both incomplete and clumsy.
(3)

Multipurpose Budget Systems
The 1960's and 19 70's witnessed significant budgetary reforms.

Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) caught the attention of
the reformers, but by the early 1970's it lost much of its luster.
9
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern
ment, Budgeting and Accounting (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1949), p. 8.
"^Gross, "The New System Budgeting," p. 120.
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Then Management by Objectives (MBO) and Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) were
introduced as alternatives to the controversial PPB System.
(A) PPB System
Much has been written about PPBS, but there is no complete
agreement in the literature as to what PPBS is. This could be attri
buted to the circumstances surrounding the PPB development and imple
mentation process in a real and specific organization.^

Wildavsky

defines PPBS as:
"....Program budgeting has no standard definition.
The general idea is that budgetary decision should
be made by focusing on output categories like
governmental goals, objectives, and products or
programs instead of inputs like personnel, equip
ment, and maintenance. As in cost-benefit analysis,
to which it iwes a greal deal, program budgeting
lays stress on estimating the total financial cost
of accomplishing objectives."12
David Novick, as the father of PPBS, considers PPBS to be a
13
management system with the following features:
(1) Definition of objectives
(2) Determination of programs
(3) Assignment of activities to programs
(4) Establishment of plan/program budget role
(5) Development of cost/benefit methods
(6) Identification and evaluation of alternatives

"'""'"M. Amry, "Program Budgeting Model for Saudi Arabian Elementary
Education: An Emphasis on Program Cost," p. 39.
12
Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost
Benefit Analysis, System Analysis, and Program Budgeting," Public
Administration Review 26 (December 1966), p. 302.
13
David Novick, Current Practice in Program Budgeting (New York:
Grane Russak, 1973), p. 5.
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(7) Development, and application of criteria
(8) Use of existing reporting system
(9) Updating of programs
Gross pointed out that most proponents and defenders of PPB
are in agreement about what PPBS is not:

-

It is not dependent upon right mathematical models
of computed calculation.
It is not a system for replacing human judgment.
It does not deal directly with such sector-proportion
questions as the relative emphasis placed upon health
vs. education, transportation vs. communications, or
military vs. civilian expenditures.14

In summary, the main thrust of the PPB System is to introduce
analysis in the governmental budgetary process and thereby to improve
policy making.

The majority of the industrial nations have experienced

the PPB System in one form or another.

In the United States, the

experience with planning in budgeting goes back to the first of this
century. Planning in budgeting was first implemented in the Borough
of Richman, New York City, for the period 1912 - lyl5. The concepts
were also tried for a short period of time in the Agricultural Depart
ment during the 1930's.^
PPB System was implemented officially in the civilian agencies
in August 1965, when President Johnson announced that all federal
agencies should implement program budgeting (PB). The Program and
Financial Plan (PFP) is the major component of the civilian system.
Changes in the PFP were made through Program Memoranda (PMs) and special
14
Gross, "The New Systems Budgeting," pp. 115-116.
^Lee and Johnson, Public Budgeting System, p. 106.
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Analytical Studies (SASs).

By June 21, 1971, the PPB System in

civilian agencies was officially abandoned.

The PPB System was also

tried in some state and local governments, but few states have achiev
ed considerable progress."^
Schick in his famous article "Death in the Bureaucracy" out17
lined the causes of the PPB System failures in the United States as:
(1) The manner in which they were introduced, across-the-board
and without much preparation.
(2) The insensitivity of new men of power to budgetary tradi
tions, institutional loyalties, and personal relations.
(3) Inadequate support and leadership.
(4) Inadequate supply of good analysts and data.
Schick observed that:
"Even if the leadership, data, analytical
capability, resources and support, interpersonal
and institutional sensitivity, and all of the
factors which worked against PPB had been
favorable, there still would have been the
anti-analytical thrust of the budgetary process
to contend with."18
The roots of the PPB System in the United Kingdom go back to the
middle 1950's.

But it was not until October, 1970, that the Reorgani

zation of Central Government declared the establishment of PPB in
governmental budgetary process.
The English system consists of three documents.
(1) The Public Expenditure Survey (PES) provides broad alloca
tion of the public resources and established priorities within
16Ibid.,

pp. 12-47.

Allen Schick, "Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal
PPB," Public Administration Review (March/April 1973), pp. 148-149.
lsIbid., p. 148.
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these resources in a systematic and comprehensive manner.
(2) Program Analyses and Review (PAR) provides a penetrating
analysis of the purposes intended to be served by the programs
and of their effectiveness in the light of alternatives.
(3) Central Policy Review Statement (CPRS) assures an overall
19
coherence with government policy.
In France, the "rationalization of budget choices," "rational
ization des choix budgetaires" (RCP), was officially adopted at the
beginning of 1968.

The RCB meant the adoption within the administration

of a coherent approach to the preparation, execution, and control of '
20

decisions at each level of responsibility.

Australia, Canada, Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, and Austria have
incorporated some features of PPBS into the budgetary process, but in
general these efforts have faced the same problems as in the United
21

States.

(B) Other Budget Reforms
By the mid 1970's, the PPB System movement was sluggish, and
other systems were introduced in order to improve the governmental
budgetary process. In the United States, Management by Objectives
(MBO) and Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) were the major contemporary budget
reforms.
The main theme of MBO is the setting out of specific objectives
19
Werner Z. Hirsch, "Program Budgeting in the United Kingdom,"
Public Administration Review (March/April 1973), pp. 120-128.
20

Philippe Huet, "The Rationalization of Budget Choices in France,"
Public Administration (London, Autumn 1970), pp. 273-286.
21
Novick, "Current Practice in Program Budgeting," pp. 69-125.
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for agencies and requiring high level periodic reports on the progress
toward achieving these objectives.

MBO was first introduced at the

beginning of the second term of the Nixon administration.

MBO, unlike

PPBS, was not done through regulations, but it was encouraged strongly
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Even though the MBO was

short-lived and died with the Nixon administration, it improved many
22

departmental budget procedures.

Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) has its roots in the private and
public sector.

Much of the literature dealing with ZBB focuses on

defining it and describing its procedures.

In general, the main theme

of ZBB is constructing a budget without any reference to what has gone
before.

In other words, the current spending level is not regarded as

an inviolate base.
ZBB is considered a new budget reform but its spirit goes back
to the industrial revolution.

The U. S. Department of Agriculture used

ZBB in 1964 for a short period of time.

The application of such budget

ing was abandoned because it was considered expensive and time consum
ing.

The concept was resurrected in the private sector at the beginning

of the 1970's.

Peter A. Pyhrr used it successfully in Texas Instruments.

Since then, the popularity of the concept has been widespread.

Accord

ing to Barton and Waldron, over one hundred companies have embraced the
23
concept of ZBB including Allied Van Lines, Westinghouse, and Zerox.
The main purpose of the adoption of the concept in the private sector
22

Thomas D. Lynch, Public Budgeting in America (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: 1979), p. 5.
23
Frank Barton, Jr., and Darryl G. Waldron, "Zero-Based Budgeting:
Is It New, or Unique?," "The Woman CPA" (January 1979), pp. 15-16.
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was to control overhead activities. In the public sector, the concept
was also resurrected by Jimmy Carter in the State of Georgia, and his
example was followed by other states. In the federal government, ZBB
was implemented by President Carter in the fiscal 1979 budget.

The Theory of Governmental Budgetary Process
Since the early part of this century, scholars in governmental
budget have called for a general budget theory or a normative theory
regardless of the budgetary environment.

Writing in 1940, V. 0. Key

saw the basic budgetary problem focused around the question of:
"On what basis shall it be decided to allocate X dollars to activity A
instead of B?"

Key continued, "The completed budgetary document repre

sents a judgement upon how scarce means should be allocated to bring
24
the maximum return in social utility."

The main thrust of Key's

article was to call for a general theory that would help in deciding
the merits of various requests for scarce resources.

Since this art

icle, several attempts have been made to meet Key's challenge.
Examples of these attempts can be found in the writings of Verne B.
Lewis, Arther Simithies, Paul A. Samuelson, Herbert S. Mitchell, Harry
25
Hardy and John Callon.

24
Key, "The Lack of Budgetary Theory," p. 1138.
25
See: Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting," Public
Administration Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1952), pp. 43-54; Paul A.
Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exponition of Theory of Public Expenditures,"
Review of Economics and Statistics (November 1955); Herbert S. Mitch
ell, School of Budget Policies for Financial Control (Danville, Ill
inois: The Interstate School Accounting Series, 1962); and Harry Hardy
and John F. Callon, Program Planning for State, County, City (Washing
ton University, 1967).
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Verne B. Lewis (1952) agreed with Key's notion and attempted
the construction of a normative economic theory of budgeting.

He

26

suggested three propositions:
(1)

The economic test, which specifies that the return from every
expenditure must be worth its cost in terms of sacrificed alter
natives, must be applied in choosing among comparative alterna
tives.

(2)

When additional expenditure for any purpose yields the same
return, incremental analysis becomes necessary and useful in
budget decision making.

(3)

The relative merit of different programs can be compared in
terms of relative effectiveness in achieving common objectives.
Another attempt to construct normative budgetary theory can be

found in the suggestions of Hardy and Gallon (1967).

They stressed the

need to compare alternative programs and their costs and the use of
27
marginal utility as a tool in comparing comparative programs.
Although the above scholars' attempts to construct a normative
budgetary theory have significant logical justifications, their attempts
have been unsuccessful so far.

The reason for this failure is the

emphasis on the development of ideal criteria for optimum resource
allocation without consideration of the real environments.

In this

context, Wildavsky argued that trying to develop a normative theory
which emphasizes how to allocate scarce resources to alternative
26

Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting," p. 43.

27
Wildavsky, The Politics of Budgetary Process, pp. 131-132.
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purposes, is "a tantamount" to a theory of how the government should
act in every particular situation.

Wildavsky observed

"....A theory that contains criteria for deter
mining what ought to be in the budget is nothing
less than a theory stating what the government
ought to do, it becomes clear that a normative
theory of budgeting would be a comprehensive and
specific political theory detailing what the govern
ment activities ought to be at a particular time.
A normative theory of budgeting, its accomplishment
and acceptance would mean the end of conflict over
the government's role in society."28
As an alternative to the normative theory, Wildavsky suggested
the development of a descriptive budgetary theory.

Such a theory

involves empirical research in how budgeting actually happens in a
specific environment.

Wildavsky argued:

"....The point is that until we develop more
adequate descriptive theory about budgeting, until
we know something about existing situations in
which the participants find themselves under our
political system, proposals for major reform must
be based on awfully inadequate understanding."29
Wildavsky's view has promoted empirical research in the reality
of doing the budget.

The major contribution of this body of

research

has been the development of descriptive models to guide the decision
30
making process in a given budgetary environment.

Theoretically, the

28

Wildavsky, The Politics of Budgetary Process, pp. 131-132.
29
Aaron Wildavsky, "Political Implications of Budgeting Reforms,"
Public Administration Reviews
30
See for examples: Thomas Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Deter
mination of State Budget," Midwest Journal of Political Science (Febru
ary 1967), pp. 27-43; Richard Fenno, "The Power of the Purse"(Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1966); John Crecine, Government Problem Solving:
A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1969); Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and
Budget Success in State Legislatures," American Political Science Review
(December 1968), pp. ]220-31; Otto Davis, H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildav
sky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," American Political Science
Review (September 1968), pp. 529-547; and John Wanat, "Basis of Budget
ary Incrementation," American Political Science Review (September 1974),
pp. 1223-28.
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manner in which budget decisions are made, or "should be" made
(The budget decision models), has created a substantial controversy
in budget literature. At one extreme is the rational comprehensive
model; at the other extreme is the incremental model. Between the two
extremes are the sacrificing and stages problem-solving models.

These

models can be visualized in Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Continuum of Budget Decision Making Models

The rational comprehensive model

The incremental change model

The stage problem solving model

The sacrificing model

1.

Rational Comprehensive Model
The decision making models vary according to their assumptions

about the objectives of decision making and the capacity to utilize
9'

information.

The underlying assumption of the comprehensive model, as

the name implies, is the utilization of scientific procedures in budget
decision making.

The scientific procedures involve performing a series

of ordered and logical steps in making a particular decision.

Qften-

. *
31
cited steps are:
(1) Specify a complete set of an organization's goals.
(2) Rank those goals in priority order.
31
John Wanat, Introduction to Budgeting (North Scitute: Massachu
setts, Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 112.
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(3) Identify all possible alternatives.
(4) Determine the cost and benefit of each alternative.
(5) Calculate the probability of occurrence of each action.
(6) Compare the possible alternatives on the basis of
cost/benefit and their probability of occurrence.
The rational model requires a perfect determination of goals,
the optimum knowledge of all alternatives, the calculation of specific
costs and benefits, and scientific processes in selecting among compet
ing alternatives.

Even though these requirements appear to be ideal

and logical procedures for decision making, their applicability in
governmental budgeting is limited.

In fact, the capability to meet

even one of these requirements is non-existent in any government.

So,

the comprehensive model is based on an ideal environment and ignores the
real world situation.

This shortcoming is the core criticism of the

comprehensive model.

In this context, Lindblom criticized the compre

hensive model of decision making on the grounds that it involves many
problems, namely:
(1) Impossibility of specifying the goals of society.
(2) Impracticability of researching all possible alternatives.
(3) Nonfeasibility of choosing the appropriate criterion for
selecting the "best" alternative.
Lindblom attributed the existence of these problems to the limits of
human intellectual capacities and to a scarcity of available informa
tion.

These limits lessen man's capacity to be comprehensive.

politics limit the power of the decision maker.

Also,

Furthermore, the cost

of generating perfect information and of determining scientific

33
analysis is tremendous.

Finally, the limitations of time hinder com-

32
prehensive analysis.
In the same line of thought, Wildavsky attacked the comprehen
sive model on the grounds that it does not represent the real environ
ment of budget decision making.

He stressed that most budget decisions

are politically motivated and that they are not based on pure rational33
ization like the comprehensive model.
2.

Increment Model
At the other extreme of the budgetary decision making continuum

is the incremental model or "muddling through."

This model was intro

duced by the critics of the comprehensive model, such as Lindblom,
Dahl, Wildavsky, and others.

Dahl and Lindblom define incrementalism

as:
"....a method of social action that takes exist
ing reality as one alternative and compares the
probable gains and losses of closely related
alternatives by making relatively small adjust
ments about whose consequences approximately as
much is known as about the consequences of the
existing reality.
Wildavsky defines the incremental model as follows:
*

"....Budgeting is incremental, not comprehen
sive. The beginning of wisdom about an agency
budget is that it is almost never actively reviewed
as a whole every year in the sense of reconsidering
the value of all existing programs as compared to
all possible alternatives. Instead, it is based on

32
Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling' Through," Public
Administration Review (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88.
33
Wildavsky, "The Politics of the Budgetary Process," pp. 127-

180.
34
Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Economics and
Welfare (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 53.
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last year's budget with special attention
given to a narrow range of increases or
decreases. Thus, the men who make the budget
are concerned with relatively small increments
to an existing base. Their attention is
focused on a small number of items over which
the budgetary battle is fought."35
The main feature of the incremental model, as these two defini
tions illustrate, is the assumption that budgetary decisions are politi
cal.

These decisions are not made in a comprehensive and rational

manner, but rather by a succession of incremental changes, "political
bargain."

The incremental model involves two important concepts:

base and the increment.

the

The base or status quo means the present or the

initial condition prior to the decision, while the increment means the
portion that is only slightly different from the initial situation as a
result of the decision.

So, the decision maker, according to the

incrementalism view, focuses only on marginal or incremental values.
The justification for this assumption is based on the reality of budget
decision making.

Since the decision making involves various interest

groups with conflicting goals and valued, these groups are expected to
bargain for changes or at least to maintain the existing situation.
The advocates of the incremental model stress the advantages of
the model as a tool for budget decision making.

Often-cited advantages

36
are:
(1) Marginal adjustment can be judged on the basis of
experience and reasonable prediction.
(2) The decision making process is simplified.
35
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 15.
36
Earl Elmore, "The South Carolina Budgetary Process; Managing the
Muddle" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1978),
p. 18.
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(3) Social values will not be neglected since the decisions
are normally agreed upon among interested parties.
There are major differences between the comprehensive and
incremental models. While the comprehensive model involves the process
of optimization, the decisions in the incremental model are based only
on the interest group's satisfaction.

Also, all possible alternatives

in the first model must be well identified; the alternatives in the
second model are only marginally different from unsatisfactory situa
tions.

Moreover, the decisions in the first model are based to some
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degree on a consensus of all interested parties.
3.

Satisficing Model
The satisficing and the stages of the problem-solving model are

rarely discussed in the literature.

The satisficing model involves the

following steps, namely:
(1) Developing a criterion to judge acceptable policy alter
natives for a given problem.
(2) Searching for the available alternatives.
(3) Selecting the first discovered acceptable alternative.
The major feature of the satisficing model is that it recognizes
the time limitation which imposes upon the decision maker in the compre
hensive model.

So, as a practical solution, the decision maker chooses

the first acceptable alternative.

The main obstacle to this model is

that the satisfaction stage is subject to judgment and difficult to
achieve.

37
Wanat, "Introduction to Budgeting," p. 115.
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4.

A Stage Problem Solving Model
The stage problem-solving model follows the same steps as

38
scientific, research methodology.
(1) Recognizing the existence of specific problem.
(2) Defining the problem.
(3) Identifying all the possible alternatives.
(4) Collecting the information
(5) Testing the proposals.
(6) Taking action and evaluating outcomes.
The main difference between this model and the comprehensive
model is that the comprehensive model is limited to deciding on a given
matter based upon maximizing goals, while the stage of the problemsolving model is aimed toward solving a specific problem.
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Empirical Studies of the Governmental Budgetary Processes
in a Given Environment

A substantial part of the empirical researches in the government
al budgetary process are concerned with constructing a descriptive model
of the decision making in a given budgetary environment at a given
period of time.

In other words, the emphasis was on the description of

empirical reality rather than on the theoretical or normative concerns.
The purpose of this section is to review the major empirical studies in
each of the three budgetary environments (rich/certain, poor/certain and
poor/uncertain). Paramount emphasis will be placed on those studies which

38Ibid.,

p. 22.

39Ibid.,

pp. 23-26.
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introduced a new methodology or modified an existing one.
1.

Rich and Certain Environments (RCE)
Wildavsky (1964) has studied, in detail, the governmental budget

ary process in the United States at the federal level (resembling RCE).
The main focus of this study was to analyze the behavior of the major
participants in the budgetary process.

By utilizing unstructured inter

views, Wildavsky found that the budget officials need to simplify, satis
fy, and rely on feedback to cope with the budget.

He also found that

the attitudes of the major participants are fairly stable across time.
He supported this notion with examples of "the fair share" and "base"
attitudes toward budgeting which are widely held and perhaps oftei
utilized in the budgetary process.

The "fair share" of a budget to an

agency is that portion of the total departmental budget it should nor
mally be expected to receive.

An agency's "base" is that level of ex

penditure which is not only currently received but can reasonably be
expected to be received in the future.
Wildavsky argued that not only a limited number of alternatives
are considered in the agency's budget, but normally this budget involves
relatively small adjustments from an existing base.

To illustrate this

argument, Wildavsky analyzed the range of variation on the percentage
of increase or decrease of appropriations as compared to previous years
(or the magnitude of change in budgetary appropriation) for 37 federal
agencies over a 12-year period.

He found that almost a third of

these cases (149 out of 444) show modifications of 5 percent or less.
Slightly more than half of the cases (233) are in the 10 percent
bracket, and just under three quarters of the cases (326) occur
within 30 percent. By using 0-30 percent as a criteria

•H..
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a criteria to define increment process, Wildavsky concluded that the
budgetary process in the United States at the federal level is incre
mental and not a comprehensive process. Thus the budget participants
are mainly concerned with relatively small increments to an existing
i
40
base.
Wildavsky's study has opened the door to the contemporary beha
vioral budgetary research in the public sector.

Since this important

contribution, a number of empirical studies have been conducted in the
federal, state, and municipal budgets in the United States and other
countries.

During the 1960's and 1970's, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky

published a series of studies which formalized, extended and empirically
examined the incremental concept in the governmental budgetary processes
41
in the United States at the federal level.
In these series of studies,
(1965, 1966, 1971, 1974) Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky explained
federal budget behavior through linear regression models.

Specifically,

they constructed a series of mathematical models which represents sever
al decision rules for both the requestors group and givers group.

For

each series of requests or appropriations, they selected that rule
which most closely represented actual behavior.

The purpose of choosing

40
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, pp. 14-15.
41
Otto A. Davis, M. A. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of
the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review (September
1966), pp. 529-47. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, "On the Process of
Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," Paper
on the Non-Market Decision-Making, I (1965), pp. 63-132. Davis, Demp
ster, and Wildavsky, "On the Process of Budgeting II: An Empirical
Study of Congressional Appropriations," in Studies of Budgeting (Amster
dam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 292-376. Davis,
Dempster, and Wildavsky, "Toward a Predictive Theory of Government
Expenditure: U. S. Domestic Appropriations," British Journal of Politi
cal Science (October 1974), pp. 419-452.
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the best model is to provide a theory which describes the actual
methods used in making budgetary decisions in certain kinds of organ
izations.

Three decision models were proposed as representative of the

behavioral rules for agency requests.

One must be selected on the

basis of which model accurately represents the behavior of. the request
group.
x

t" Vt-i+

\ " ¥t -l "

Xt

Where Y

• B3Xt-l

+

£t

B2 (It-l

(1>

" Xt-1»

+

(2>

(3>

£t

represents the appropriation granted by the appropriation

committees for any given agency for Year

X

is the appropriation

requested by any given agency for Year^; the averages or mean percent
age are represented by Bo> B^, B^, respectively; and ^ is the incre
ment or decrement due to circumstances.
The first model (Equation #1) views the agency request for a
certain year as a fixed mean percentage of the committee's appropria
tion for that agency in the previous year plus a random variable (nor
mally distributed with mean of zero and unknown but finite variance)
for that year.

The random variable ( £. ) represents the sum of the

effects of all events, that is an increment or decrement to the usual
percentage of the previous year's appropriation.

This model is based

on the assumption that the agency does not consider it desirable to
make extraordinary requests which might be viewed with suspicion by the
giver group.

The second model (Equation #2) specifies that the agency

request for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the committee's
appropriation and the agency request for the previous year plus a
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stochastic disturbance.

This model is based on the assumption that the

agency desires to smooth out its stream of appropriations by taking
into account the difference between its request and appropriations for
the previous year.

The final model (Equation #3) specifies that the

agency request for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the
agency's request for the previous year plus a random variable. This mod
el is based on the assumption that the appropriation committee has so
much confidence in the agency that it tends to give an appropriation
which is almost identical to the request.
Also three models were proposed as representative to the
behavioral rules for the appropriations committee.

Again one must be

selected on the basis of which model most accurately represents the
behavior of the givers group in response to any agency request.
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Where A^, A^, A^, A^, A^ are the fixed average percentages; i
stochastic disturbance; c.

is the

is a stochastic disturbance representing

that part of the appropriations attributed to the special circum
stances;

is a dummy variable which in year t represents: £

equation (1) obtains,

(Yfc ^ - X

if

if equation (2) obtains, and

if equation (3) obtains.
The first model (Equation #4) specifies that the giver appropri
ation for an agency in a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the
agency's request in that year plus a stochastic disturbance.

This
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model is based on the assumption that an agency's request is relative
ly a stable index of the funds needed by the agency to carry out its
program.
group

The second model (Equation #5) specifies that the giver

appropriation for an agency is a fixed mean percentage of the

agency's request for that year plus a stochastic disturbance represent
ing a deviation from the usual relationship between the giver and the
agency in the previous year plus a random variable for current year.
This model is based on the assumption that the giver group denotes from
the fixed mean (usual percentage) due to the suspicion that the agency
is padding the current year request.

The third model (Equation #6)

specifies that the giver group appropriation for an agency is a fixed
mean percentage of the agency's request for a certain year plus a
fixed mean percentage of the agency's request for a certain year plus
a fixed mean percentage of dummy variable plus random variable.

This

model is based on the assumption that some members of the giver group
have intimate knowledge of the budgetary process of the agency.
In order to choose the best model which resembles the behavior of
the requestor and giver groups, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky studied
times series data for the period 1947-1963 for fifty-six non-defense
agencies of the United States government.

The major findings of these

studies show that:
(1) The budgetary process of the United States government is
equivalent to a set of temporarily stable decision rules.
(2) The most popular combinations of behavior are the simple
ones represented by Equation #1 for the requestor group and #4
for the giver group.
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(3) When the giver group was a sophisticated strategy such as
Equation #5 or #6, the requestor group tends to use the simple
strategy represented by Equation #1.
(4) When the giver group grants exactly the amount requested,
the requestor group tends to use more sophisticated strategy
represented by Equation #3.
Obviously these findings show that the budgetary process in the
United States government can be characterized as an incremental process
where this year's decisions basically rely on last year's decisions.

In

addition, the budget participants use simple original maneuvers;
furthermore, these findings show that the behavior of the budgetary
process follows quite a simple law despite the agreement on complexity.
Sharkansky (1965) studied the budgetary processes of the agencies
of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

He

observed the variations in the agencies' budget strategies in this
Department.

So, he developed a model to explain these strategic differ

entiations.

Although this study ruled out the plausibility of common

strategical behavior among the different agencies, it confirmed the
previous studies' conclusion that the budgetary process at the United
42
States federal level is incremental in nature.
Fenno (1966) analyzed 576 congressional appropriations for the
period 1947-1962.

He used two measures of change in the federal budget:

(1) the relationships between agencies requests and Congressional

Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations Subcommittie: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies," Midwest Journal of
Political Science (August 1965), pp. 254-5.
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appropriations, and (2) the change in appropriations granted to a given
agency from one year to the next. The findings of this study' supported
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky's conclusion, and stressed the fact that
budgetary process at the federal level could be characterized as an
incremental process.^
Natchez and Bupp (1973) investigated the governmental budgetary
process of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The unit of analysis was the

program level instead of the whole agency budget.

While they concurred

with the previous researchers that the budgetary process is incremental
for the entire agency's budget, they noticed the disappearance of
44
incrementalism at the program level.
Wanat (1974) drew a line between descriptive and explanatory
incrementalism.

He pointed out that for a phenomenon to be descrip

tively incremental, changes in the system have only to be marginally
different from status quo.

But for a phenomenon to be explained by

incrementalism, reasons must be given for the marginality of change.
So, he criticized the Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky models on the
grounds that the models concentrated on the descriptive rather than ex
planatory incrementalism.

In order to explain the incremental increase

on budget requests and the restriction of cuts to those requested incre
ments, Wanat examined all general fund line-items in the regular Labor
Department budget for the period 1968-1972. He found that the distinction
between mandatory and incremental requests and the differential treatment
43
Fenno, The Power of the Purse.
44
Peter B. Natchez and Irvin Bupp, "Policy and Priority in the
Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review (September 1973),
pp. 951-63.
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of those tvo kinds of requests by Congress was a good explanation of
the incremental changes in requests and appropriations.

In a later

study, Wanat (1976) showed that the use of personnel in studying budget
relations yielded results different from those obtained by using
dollars data.

In this study he analyzed data from the budget exper

ience of twelve domestic federal agencies in the 1950s and 1960s.
found that the correlation between the dollar
tions were uniformly high.

He

requests and appropria

But the correlation between personnel

requested and personnel allowed for the same agencies were generally
lower than the comparable correlations on dollar data.

He concluded

that when inflationary forces and some of the mandated increases are
removed, Congress acted more independently of agency requests than in
45
the dollar data.
Wildavsky (1975) observed that incrementalism is becoming insti
tutionalized in other rich nations.

For example, in France the Parlia

ment votes only on additions or subtractions from past totals and the
Ministry of Finance treats past commitments as if they were inviolable.
In England a new budgetary procedure has been adopted to make it more
difficult for old items to be taken out of the existing base.
mentalism is also practiced in Japan.

Incre

The Ministry of Finance imposes

a 125 percent ceiling over the past year and the majority of the budgetA-6
ary decisions are concentrated to this increment.
45
John Wanat, "Bases of Budgetary Incrementalism," pp. 1221-8, and
"Personnel Measures of Budgetary Interaction,11 Western Political Quar
terly (June 1976), pp. 29 5-7.
46
Wildavsky, Budgeting:
Processes, pp. 216-19.

A Comparative Theory of Budgetary

45
Based on the empirical researches in RCE, Wildavsky (1975)
summarized the characteristics of the budgetary process as well as
47
the behavior of the participants in this environment as:
(1) The budgetary process in these countries classified as
RCE is incremental in nature where past decisions serve as
bases from which future expenditures are determined.

Thus,

the budgetary participants are concerned mainly with the
changes from the existing base.
(2) The participants in this environment use modest amount of
strategic activities, since the relationships between then are
highly determined and any gross departures from this expecta
tion are easy to discover.
(3) The budgetary process in this environment is the simplest
in calculation comparing to other environments.

Rich and

certain nations generally budget by increments (last year plus
or minus a certain percentage) so, the administrative agencies
in these environments request certain funds with this relation
ship in mind.

The central organ acts almost in the same manner-

Hence, the budgetary process is very simple compared to the
other environments.
II.

Poor and Certain Environments (PCE)
Numerous studies have been conducted on the governmental

budgetary processes at the local level resembling (PCE).

Anton

investigated the governmental budgetary processes of three cities
in Illinois. He found that in each of the cities, agency heads

47Ibid.,

pp. 203-219.
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are instructed to base their spending requests on the estimated avail
ability of revenue.

So, the first step in formulating the city budget

is to determine how much money will be available, rather than how much
will have to be spent.

Anton concluded that revenue constraint is the
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major feature of the budgetary process at the local level.
Barber (1966), in laboratory experiments, examined the govern
mental budgetary process of twelve boards of finance in Connecticut.
He noticed the lack of comprehensiveness in the boards" decisions.
Instead they relied on simplified techniques and criteria.
Crecine (1969), in a computer simulation technique, analyzed the
budgetary process of three metropolitan governments (Pittsburgh,
Detroit, and Cleveland).

He concurred with Anton that the key feature

of municipal budgeting is that the budget must be balanced to meet the
revenue constraint.

Also, this revenue constraint governs the behavior

49
of the major participants in the budgetary process.
Caputo (1970), by utilizing open end interview format, studied
the behavior of the major participants at various stages of the budget
ary process in four medium-size cities (Midfora and Bridgeport, Connec
ticut; and Chicapee and Springfield, Massachusetts).

One of the main

conclusions of this study was that the majority of the budgetary deci
sions were based on prior budgetary expenditures after they were justi
fied on the basis of fund availability.

He also concluded that the

budgetary processes in these cities are basically political in nature
^Thomas J. Anton, Budgeting in Three Illinois Cities (Urbana:
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois,
1964).
49
Crecine, Government Problem Solving; A Computer Simulation of
Municipal Budgeting.
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so the behavior of the budget participants is best described as "games
manship," and the usual behavior pattern was one of compromise and
negotiation."^
Meltsner and Wildavsky (1970) examined the nature of budgetary
process of Oakland, California.

They found that the most important

characteristic of budgeting in Oakland is revenue behavior which results
from financial constraints such as a balanced budget and shortages in
51
revenues.
The characteristics of the budgetary process and the behavior of
52
the participants in PCE was summarized by Wildavsky (1975) as:
(1)

The budgetary process in PCE is revenue oriented due to the lack

of resource positions.

The budgetary participants in this environment

are aware of their future needs; however, most of them compromise con
siderably in the fact of limited resources.

Thus, the whole budget pro

cess in this environment becomes a revenue oriented and expenditures are
determined according to revenue availability.
(2)

The budgetary participants in this environment use least amount

of strategic activities.

Due to the lack of resources and certainty in

predicting future funds, the budgetary relationships among participants
are highly predictable; thus, any departure from these pre-determined
relationships is easy to discover.
(3)

Certainty in this environment creates simplicity in budget

"^David Armand Caputo, "The Normative and Empirical Implications
of the Budgetary Processes of Four Medium-Size Cities" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970).
53-A. J. Meltsner and A. Wildavsky, "Leave City Budgeting Alone:
A Survey, Case Study and Recommendations for Reform," from Financing
the Metropolis, edited by J. P. Crecine (Stage Publications, Inc. 1970),
Chapter 12.
52
Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Pro
cesses, pp. 203-219.
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calculations; however, poverty limits change in the budget's original
base.
Ill.

Poor and Uncertain Environments (PUE)
Caiden and Wildavsky in their book "Planning and Budgeting in

Ppor Countries" examined the major features of the governmental budget
ary processes in poor and uncertain countries.

They pointed out that

the major feature of the budgetary processes in these countries is
repetition.

The basic reason for this phenomenon is extreme and

extensive uncertainty which, when combined with severe scarcity of
financial resources, narrow the time span of budget decisions and
enforce the budget participants to renegotiate the budget throughout
the year.

The repetitive budget enforces the budget participants to

enact in a complete series of strategic maneuvers.

Thus, increases

53
the complexity of the budget decision making process.
Patton (1975) conducted an empirical study to examine the bud
getary process of the Confederate States of America during the Civil
War.

The Confederacy resembled a poor and uncertain environment because

the sources and quantities of revenues and thus expenditures were
uncertain.

The government had to deal with lack of information, few

trained personnel and political instability as well as military prob
lems.

Thus, the Confederacy experienced budgetary poverty because of

the inability to mobilize sufficient resources at the same time, the
Confederacy experienced budgetary uncertainty because of inability to
project the flow of either expenditures or revenues in the near future.
This study concluded that the Confederate budgetary process was repetitive in terms of both requests and appropriations. The repetitive
53
Caiden and Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries.
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budgeting encouraged strategic maneuvers to be used extensively by the
budget participants and increased the complexity of the decision making
process. Patton's major findings concurred with Caiden and Wildavsky's
conclusions.
Wildavsky (1975) summarized the characteristics of the budgetary
process as well as the behavior of the participants in this environment
55
as:
(1) The poor and uncertain nations employ a budgetary process
of repetition.

Lack of sufficient resources leads the partici

pants in this environment to delay expenditures in order to ensure
that their financial resources are not depleted.

In the mean

time, uncertainty causes them to reprogram or repeat funds in
order to adjust to rapidly changing conditions.

Thus, the bud

get in this environment becomes meaningless and mainly repeti
tive of the previous years.
(2) The budgetary strategies are most used in this environment.
The existing poverty and uncertainty increase the strategic
activities among the participants.

Since the administrative

agencies are not sure of their needs and the control organ does
not have the financial capability to grant these requests, the
administrative agencies tend to exaggerate their request, know
ing in advance that these requests will be substantially altered
by the control organ.
54
Carl Vernon Patton, "Budgeting Under Crisis: The Confederacy
as a Poor Country," Administrative Science Quarterly (September 1975),
pp. 355-69.
"^Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
Process, pp. 203-219.
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(3) PUE has the most complicated budgetary process among all
other environments. Poverty and uncertainty make it difficult
for the budget participants to predict next year's budget.

Any

one financial year is likely to be quite different from last or
next year's budget in terms of revenue and expenditures.

Hence,

the budgetary process in this environment becomes very complex
in calculating the budget, and in many times most of the deci
sions are arbitrary.
IV.

Mixed Environment
Wealth and certainty are mixed in different proportions in Ameri

can States. Some have the characteristics of rich and certain environ
ment and others are most like the poor and certain environment.

At the

state level, a number of empirical studies have been conducted to study
the governmental budgetary processes.

Anton (1967) investigated the

budgetary process in Illinois for the period 1961-1963 by utilizing an
open-end interview format.

His conclusion supported the incrementalism

56
approach to the budgetary process.
Sharkansky analyzed the requests of 592 state agencies in 19
states.

He concluded that the budgetary process at the state level is

57
a combination of incrementalism and legislative dependence.
Elmore (1978) in his study of South Carolina's budgetary process
confirmed the notion of incrementalism in the budgetary process.

One

important attribute of Elmore's study is that he employed the aggregate
data approach which was introduced by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky.
56
Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expendi
tures," pp. 27-43.
"^Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget
Success in State Legislatures," pp. 1220-31.
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In addition, he utilized the descriptive analysis by Anton.

In other

words, he utilized the following tools to investigate the budgetary
process.
(1) Modification of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky's models
to test the notion of incrementalism in the South Carolina
budgetary process.
(2) Modification of Anton's open-end interview to describe
the role perceptions of major budgetary participants.
The major finding of Elmore's study is that incrementalism as a
descriptive tool and as a bargaining process in South Carolina's bud
getary process is retained, but incrementalism as an explanatory tool
to provide reasons for the marginality of changes in budget outcomes
is rejected.^
In summary, Figure 4 outlines the characteristics of the budget
ary process, frequency of strategic activities, and the degree of com
plexity in calculation for the classes of budgetary environments.
Since the budgetary process in rich and uncertain environments,
to the knowledge of this researcher, has never been investigated, the
present study is aimed toward examining empirically the characteris
tics of the budgetary process in this environment.

This involves

analyzing the role of the major participants in the budget of the Saudi
Arabian government, and examining the major characteristics of the
Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process.

Finally, the character

istics of the budgetary processes and the role of the major budgetary
participants in rich and uncertain environments will be compared with
those of the other environments.
58
Elmore, The South Carolina Budgetary Process.
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Figure 4. The Characteristics of the Budgetary Processes, Frequency of the Strategic Maneuvers, and
the Degree of Complexity in the Calculation for the Classes of Budgetary Environments.
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CHAPTER III

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966, 1966, 1971, 1974) have
formalized research methods that investigate the budgetary process in
rich and certain environments.

Recent research in the other budgetary

environments can be seen as refinements, extensions, or challenges to
the basic orientation presented in these works.

Since no study has

been conducted to investigate the budgetary process in rich and uncer
tain environments, reliable precedent with respect to methodology in
this environment is unavailable.
methods is used in this study.

Therefore, a combination of research

This combination includes library re

search, interviews, empirical testing of the quantitative budgetary
data from the records of the Saudi Arabian government, and statistical
analysis.
This chapter provides an overview of the methodology employed
in the investigation of the budgetary process in rich and uncertain
budgetary environment of Saudi Arabia.

The first section describes the

interview phase of the study designed to investigate the nature of the
budgetary process and the budget participants role perceptions.
Section II describes the quantitative analysis of budget data.
I. Interview
Open-end interviews were conducted with major participants in
the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process. The interview format
53
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is similar to that used by Caputo (1970) in his study of four mediumsize cities.^

The major objectives of this research tool are to pro

vide a description of the budgetary process and the role perceptions
of the major budgetary participants.

Following is an outline of the

interview objectives, a description of instrumentation, and a specifi
cation of the subjects.
The Objectives of the Open-End Interview
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky series of the studies (1966,
1966, 1971, 1974) relied heavily on testing budget data for the period
1947-1963 in studying the characteristics of the budgetary process of
the United States.

Anton (1967) utilized the open-end interview format

in investigating the budgetary process in Illinois for the period 19611973.

Elmore (1970) combined both research tools (analysis of budget

data and interviews) in analyzing the South Carolina budgetary process
for the period 1967-1977.

The objectives of utilizing the open-end

interview in this study are: (A) to describe the actual budgetary pro
cess and (B) to determine the role perceptions of major budgetary
participants.
(A) Description of the Actual Budgetary Process
Wildavsky suggested the development of a descriptive bud
getary theory as a substitute to the normative theory that was
suggested by Kay. Such a theory involves descriptive and
empirical research as to how the budget is actually created.
In this context, he argued

"'"Caputo, "The Normative and Empirical Implications of the Budget
ary Processes of Four Medium-Size Cities.11
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"...the point is that until we develop more
adequate descriptive theory about budgeting,
until we know something about existing situations
in which the participants find themselves under our
political system, proposals for major reforms must
be based on awfully inadequate understanding.1^
One major objective of using the open-end interview format in
this study is to provide knowledge (or a description) of the budgetary
process of the Saudi Arabian government.

This knowledge is obtained

by questioning the major budgetary participants about the actual
budgetary process. Personal observations of the major steps of the
budgetary process were used to verify these responses.
(B) Role Perceptions of the Major Budgetary Participants
The second major objective of the interview is to describe
and analyze the role perception of the budgetary participants
in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process.
Apart from economic or political differences, any governmental
budgetary process includes two groups of participants - the "requestor"
group and the "giver" group. The first group commonly is comprised ot
the government administrative agencies while the second group includes
the central control organs.

Every agency budget office is viewed as

the location for developing and orchestrating the budget process.
The pervasive notion in government budget literature is that the
role of the agency budget official or requestor group varies along a
continuum ranging from expansion of resources to maintenance of avail3

able resources.

In rich and certain environments, Wildavslcy maintains

the position that agency people are expected to advocate increasing
^Wildavsky, "Political Implications of Budgeti;

leforms," p. 189.

3
Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expendi
tures," p. 27.
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4
appropriations.

Anton reached the same conclusion at the state level.

He observed:
"...I do have a good deal of confidence in the
assertion that very few responsible agency admin
istrators will be likely to request less money than
is currently available to them.
Anton attributed this phenomenon to the environmental pressure to
expand the agency budget.

He continued:

"...To request a smaller budget than the current
budget is to suggest that the job being done by
the agency is not sufficiently important to warrant
a grant or claim on state resources and that the
administrator in charge of that job is not suffi
ciently aggressive (or competent) to make the claim
....requesting an increase is the surest method
available to the administrator to satisfy each of
its audiences.
Lafavor, in his study of the New Mexico budgetary process, docu
mented that the operating agency heads consistently request more funds.
Elmore, in his study of the South Carolina agencies, concluded that the
g

agency heads were concerned only with increasing expenditure levels.
The maintenance of currently available resources (maintaining
agency requests within the boundaries of the actual needs) is the other
extreme of the budget official's role.

This role was documented by

Rufus Browning in his study of two Wisconsin departments.

In an inter

view with the budget official, the official response was:
4
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budget Process, p. 18.
Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expendi
tures," p. 27.
^Ibid., pp. 28-29.
^John Lafavor, "Zero-Base Budgeting in New Mexico," State Govern
ment (Spring 1974), p. 109.
g

Elmore, The South Carolina Budgetary Process:

Man in the Muddle,

p. 74.
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"...The budget is supposed to reflect only the
judgement of the administrator. There is no
point in playing it cozy in trying to secondguess everybody along the line. The budget
should reflect only felt needs, nothing more,
or less.
Thus, the evidence from empirical research suggests that the agency
budget official is mainly concerned with .increasing budget appropria
tions.
The budgetary process literature emphasizes decision-making
criteria and agency budgetary strategy.

In other words, the criteria

the budget officials use to decide how much to request and the strate
gies to be used to maintain or increase the amount of money available
to the governmental agencies are investigated.

Wildavsky pointed out

that the simplest approach would be to add up the cost of all worth
while projects and to submit the total.Due to the limitations in
resources, the governmental agencies use strategic processes to compete
for these scarce resources.
In a RCE, budgetary decisions are often characterized as incre
mental.

So, the administrative agencies in this environment request

certain funds with these relationships in mind.

Thus, the decisions

are considered simple compared with other budgetary environments.

At

the same time, the administrative agencies do not rely heavily on
strategic maneuvers because the relationships between the agency and
the control organ are highly determined.
In PCE, the budgetary process is characterized as revenue
9

Quoted from Anton, "Role and Symbols in Determination of State
Expenditures," p. 28.
"^Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budget Process, p. 31.

•K».

58
constraint.

Certainty in this environment creates simplicity in calcu

lations, but poverty limits change in the budget's original base.
Because of the lack of resources and certainty in predicting future
funds, the budgetary relationships among participants are highly pre
dictable, and the administrative agencies in this environment use stra
tegic maneuvers less than any other environments.
The budgetary process in a PUE is characterized as repetitive
budgeting. The administrative agencies in this environment face very
complicated problems in deciding the amount of funds to be requested.
Poverty and uncertainty make it difficult for the budget participants
to predict next year's budget.

Any fiscal year is quite different from

the next or previous year in terms of revenues, expenditures, foreign
aids, and inflation. Hence, budgetary process in this environment is
very complex in calculating the requests of the administrative agency.
The administrative agencies in this environment rely heavily on stra
tegic maneuvers in order to survive, so they tend to exaggerate their
requests knowing in advance that these requests will be substantially
altered by the control organ.
The second group in any governmental budgetary process can be
characterized as the giver group. The power and the organization
structure of the giver group varies according to the country's political
environment.

In some countries, the power of making most of the budget

ary decisions rests in the central-control organ.

In others, this power

is divided among different political organizations.

"'""'vildavsky, Budgeting:
Processes, pp. 5-231.

A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
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An example of the first category exists in most poor and uncer
tain countries. The Ministry of Finance or equivalent in those count
ries is the most powerful governmental institution in budgetary
decisions.
An example of the second category is the governmental budgetary
process of the United States.

The central-control organ in the United

States is relatively weak compared with poor and uncertain countries.
In fact, there is no Finance Ministry in the United States.

The direc

tor of the office of management and budget does not have the final
decision in budgetary matters.

Actually, Congress can override the

judgement of the office of management and budget (OMB).

The role of

the giver group in the United States changes as the budget moves
through the budget cycle.

After the OMB has reviewed the budget

requests and final decisions are made, the OMB becomes an advocate
12
before the legislative appropriation committee.
The pervasive notion in governmental budgetary literature is
that the giver group acts as a guardian of the public treasures.
Wildavsky described the most generally accepted role of the appropriation
13
committee as guardian of the public purse.

Schick, in his study of

the control pattern in state budget execution, concluded that the
"watchdog" function was the most accurate description of the budget
14
review officer's role.

Anton, in his study of state expenditures,

attributed the "watchdog" role to the mistrust in the agency budget
12Ibid.,

pp. 105-207.
13
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 147.
14
Allen Schick, "Control Patterns in State Budget Execution,"
Public Administration Review (1964), pp. 47-106.
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process and to political and personal reasons. He observed:
"...recognizing the strength of built-in pressures
to expand budget, then, and believing that these
pressures will be reflected in budget requests,
reviewing officials naturally see themselves as
"cutter"...To explain ciie apparent negativism of
budget review officials solely in terms of their
mistrust of agency budget estimates, however,
would be to overlook the personal and political
stake they have in doing what they do....Their
failure to make the cuts others expected them to
make would challenge the grounds for the existence
of specialized review agencies and thus threaten
the jobs they hold."15
Elmore, in his study of the South Carolina budgetary process,
described the role of the state budget and control board as "gatekeeper"
to the state treasury.^

In poor and uncertain environments, Wildavsky

pointed out that repetitive budgeting results in careless estimating by
departments, which leads to indiscriminate budget cutting by the
finance ministry.^
The purpose of the role perception portion of the interview
phase is to determine the perceived role of the participants in rich
and uncertain environment, specifically, the Saudi Arabian budgetary
process.

The role perceptions determined from the interviews are used

in conjunction with the analysis of actual budgetary data described in
the second methodological stage to investigate conformity of role per
ception and actual decision behavior.

15
Anton, "Roles and Symbols in Determination of State Expendi
tures," p. 30.
"^Elmore, The South Carolina Budgetary Process: Managing the
Muddle, p. 80.
17
Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Process,
p. 147.
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Instrumentation
Open-end interviews were conducted with the major participants
in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process during the period
May 14, 1980 - August 18, 1980.

The interview format is similar to

that used by Caputo (1970) with some modification (see Appendix I).
Since English is not the first language of the participants, the inter
views were conducted in Arabic (see Appendix II).

The responses were

hand written, documented, and then translated back into English.
Finally, the results were transcribed.
from thirty minutes to two hours.

The interviews ranged in length

The average interview was approxi

mately one hour.
As previously stated, the interviews were designed to provide a
description of the budgetary process and to describe the role percep
tion of the major budgetary participants.

To achieve these objectives,

the interview used in this study stressed the following main points:
(1) The formal and informal budgetary procedures.
(2) The role of the participants during each stage of the.
process.
(3) The decision criteria used by the participants during each
stage of the process, the reason for using these criteria, and
their effectiveness.
(4) The formal and informal contacts with the other budgetary
participants during each stage of the process and their results.
Subjects
The subjects of the interview consisted of a non-random sample
of the participants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process.
A total of 47 interviews were completed. It was felt that a larger
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sample was both Impratical and unnecessary due to the observed redun
dancy in the later interviews.
Data Analysis
To describe the Saudi Arabian budgetary process, the responses
of all subjects were examined to determine whether a discernable pat
tern existed among them.

The results were also confirmed by reviewing

official government publications and personal observations of the
actual process.
The data gathered were also used to analyze the role perception
of the budgetary participants.

Accordingly, the subjects were divided

into groups (see Figure 5).
(1) The directors of the budget or fiscal department of each
agency (DBA).
(2) The staff of the budget or fiscal department for each
agency (SBA).
(3) The senior staff officers of the budget department of the
Ministry of Finance (OBF).
(4) The staff of the budget department of the Ministry of
Finance (SBF).
The role, the decision criteria, the reason for using the cri
teria and effectiveness, the formal and informal contacts with other
participants and its results are analyzed for each group.
Secondly, the subjects were then divided into two groups,
namely:
(1) The Requestor Group which consisted of the DBA and SBA
for each agency.
(2) The Giver Group which consisted of the OBF and SBF.
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Figure 5.

Summary of the Interviewing Process.

TOTAL COMPLETED
INTERVIEWS

SUBJECTS

I.

II.

REMARKS

Requestor Group
1.

The directors of
budget or fiscal
departments for
each agency.
(DBA)

15

Non-random sample consisted
of 15 directors of the
budget or fiscal department
of 15 non-defense agencies.

2.

The staff of the
budget or fiscal
department for
each agency.
(SBA)

15

Non-random sample consisted
of one of the staff of the
budget or fiscal department
of 15 non-defense agencies.

Giver Group
1.

The senior staff
officers of the
budget department
of the Ministry
of Finance.
(OBF)

Non-random sample of the
staff who make the primary
decisions in reviewing the
agencies' budget.

The staff of the
budget department
of the Ministry of
Finance.
(SBF)

10

TOTAL

47

Non-random sample of the
staff members who are
directly involved in the
budget process.
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II.

Empirical Testing of the Quantitative
Budget Data

The second stage of che study is designed to determine whether
the quantitative budget data are consistent with the budget descrip
tion and role perceptions suggested by the interviews.
The first two hypotheses to be tested during this stage related
to the nature of the budgetary process in the rich and uncertain envi^
ronment of Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the degree of incrementalism
in the process and the extent to which supplemental budgeting is used.
The third hypothesis investigates which factor (independent variables)
influence the budgetary output (the dependent variable) in this environ
ment and the relative strength of those influences.
The Degree of Incrementalism in the Budgetary Process
As discussed previously, research in the other three budgetary
environments has shown that in only the rich and certain environments
is the incremental process present.

Based upon this previous research,

it does not appear whether wealth or a combination of wealth and cer
tainty that lends itself to incrementalism.

However, it is argued here

that the presence of uncertainty in an environment will not allow for
an incremental process.

The combination of unreliable forecasts, non-

diversified revenue, lack of information, and lack of qualified per
sonnel characterizing an uncertain environment is inconsistent with
incremental budgetary process.

To investigate the degree of incre

mentalism in the budgetary process the magnitude of year-to-year
budgetary change will be analyzed.
Previous research concerning the governmental budgetary process
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in different environments has investigated the magnitude of budgetary
changes from one year to the next as a means of testing the degree of
incrementalism in a given budgetary process. Wildavsky (1964) analyzed
the range of variation as the percentage of increase or decrease of
appropriation as compared to previous years (or the magnitude of bud
getary changes) for a sample of the U. S. federal agencies over twelve
years. He found that a third of these cases (149 out of 444) show
modification of 5 percent or less.

Slightly more than half of the

cases (233) show less than 10 percent modification.

Approximately 75

percent of the cases (326) show modication within 30 percent. The
study used criteria of 0 to 30 percent change to define an incremental
process.

Accordingly, it was concluded that the budgetary process in
18

the United States at the federal level is incremental.

Fenno (1966) analyzed the changes in 576 congressional appropri
ations granted to federal agencies from one year to the next.

By using

0 to 20 percent as a cut-off point, it was found that almost three
quarters of the agencies had grown on an incremental scale. Thus, he
concluded that the budgetary process in the United States is incre19
mental.

Bailey and O'Connor defined adjustments in the range of

0-10 percent as incremental; modification in the range of 11 - 30
percent as intermediate; and variations over 30 percent as nonincremental.^

18
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 14.
19
Fenno, The Power of the Purse.
20
John J. Bailey and Robert J. O'Connor, "Operationalizing Incre
mentalism: Measuring the Muddles," Public Administration Review,
January/February 1975, pp. 60-63.
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This study uses similar techniques to investigate the degree of
incrementalism in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process.
Magnitude of change in budgetary allocations is defined as the ratio
of allocation in a given fiscal year to the allocations in the last
fiscal year.

Thus,

k ALL

ALL
g~t

t

^8,t-1
where:
& All
8 > *-

= The Magnitude of Change in budgetary allocations for agency g in fiscal year t.

ALL
8s'-

= The original budgetary allocations for
agency g in fiscal year t

ALL
,
8 > t-±

= The original budgetary allocations for
agency g in fiscal year t-1.

Since there is no clear definition of "incrementalism" in bud
getary literature, and the issue remains subjective, this study recog
nizes the conservative criteria used by Bailey and O'Connor to test
the degree of incrementalism in the Saudi Arabian governmental budget
ary process.

Three categories are identified:

(I) "Incremental"

where

ALL .
8>t

= 1.00-1.10

(II) "Relatively Incremental"

where

ALL
8>

= 1.11-1.30

(III)"Non-Incremental

where

l.OO^&ALL

\ 1.30

8 > •-/

The first hypothesis tested is as follows:
HI.

The budgetary process of Saudi Arabian non-defense

agencies is non-incremental in nature.

The magnitude of

changes in budgetary allocation (£ALL
)^1.30 or ^1.00).
8> t
^
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The magnitude of change in budgetary allocations for 28 agencies
is analyzed.

The number of cases ir. each category is calculated and

tabulated for each fiscal year.

Also, the ratio of the cases in each

category to the total cases in each fiscal year is calculated and
tabulated.
Since the magnitude of change in budgetary allocations might
vary according to type of expenditure, the data are further analyzed
by type of expenditure.

Hence, the magnitude of change in budgetary

allocations for each type of expenditure is defined as:
ALL.
A ALL.

=

i,g,t

where:
ALL.
1

= The magnitude of change in budgetary allo-

> 8> «-

cations for expenditure i, agency g in
fiscal year t.
k ALL.
1

= The original budgetary allocation for expen-

> §»*-

diture i, agency g in fiscal year t.
ALL.
•*-»6 >

,

= The original budgetary allocations for
expenditure i, agency g in fiscal year t-1.

i

= The types of expenditures: salaries, general
expenditures, other expenditures, and
projects.

The number of cases in each catetory of incrementalism calcu
lated for each type of expenditure for each period of the study.

Also,

the ratio of the cases in each category to the total cases in the
entire period is calculated and reported for each type of expenditure.
The magnitude of changes in actual expenditures are used also
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to test the degree of incrementalism in budgeting process.

The magni

tude of change in actual expenditures is defined as:
AE
JLII

& AE
s,t

"g.t-i

where:
£ AEg

t

= The magnitude of change in actual expendi
tures for agency g in fiscal year t.

AE
8> t

= The actual expenditures for agency g in
fiscal year t.

AE
,
8) t—1

= The actual expenditures for agency g in
fiscal year t-1.

The number of cases in each category is calculated and tabulated
for each fiscal year.

Also, the ratio of the cases in each category to

the total cases in each fiscal year is calculated.
The Existence of Supplemental Budgeting
Wildavsky conjectured that if a rich and uncertain budgetary
environment exists the participants will engage in supplemental budget
ing.

In this context, he argued:
"....My hypothesis about budgeting in environments that
are rich but administratively uncertain is that, when
such environments are discovered, they will be found
to engage in supplemental budgeting - treating each
expenditure request and grant as if it were a supple
mental due to unexpected circumstances. The spending
agency would wait until its funds ran out, because
it could not estimate what it would need or actually
be able to spend, and the finance ministry would
reconsider its allowments, because it was not at all
certain of how much revenue it could raise or had on
hand."22

22
Wildavsky, Budgeting:
Processes, p. 11.
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Thus, uncertainty in budgetary environment creates an inability
on the part of budgetary participants to anticipate short-run needs
and wealth allows such practice.

Accordingly, the need for supple

mental budgeting is hypothesized.

The second hypothesis tested is:

H2.

Supplemental budgeting is a characteristic of the

budgetary process of Saudi Arabian non-defense agencies
as evidenced by the existence of supplementary budgets
in the majority (50%) of the agencies for the majority
(50%) of the fiscal years studied.
To test the hypothesis data is calculated as to the number and
percentage of agencies that engaged in supplemental budgeting during
each fiscal year during the study period.
The Relations Among Participants
To gain a keener insight into the nature of the budgetary pro
cess and the interaction among budgetary participants, another series
of tests is employed to investigate the factors which influence the
budgetary output (budget expansion).

A group of variables suggested

to be influential in the budgetary process by previous research are
empirically tested for potential relationships with the dependent
23
variable.

The third hypothesis tested is:
H3.

A significant association exists between budget expan

sion in the Saudi Arabian budgetary process and agency
acquisitiveness, Ministry of Finance support, estimated

23
See for example, Sharkansky, "Agency Requests Gubernatorial
Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures;" Wannat, "Personnel
Measures of Budgetary Interaction;" and Elmore, The South Carolina
Budgetary Process: Managing the Muddle.
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revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion, and spending
efficiency during that last period.
Numerous techniques have been utilized in the literature to
investigate relationships among various budget participants in other
environments.

For example, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, in a series

of studies (1966, 1966, 1971, 1974), explained the federal budget
behavior of the United States through linear models.

Specifically, a

series of mathematical models was constructed to represent several
decision rules for both the Requestors Group and for the Givers Group.
For each series of requests or appropriations, they selected that rule
which most closely represented actual behavior. Sharakansky, in his
study of the budgetary process in nineteen states, investigated the
relationships between the budgetary participants by analyzing the
annual percentage changes in each stage and by analyzing the coeffi
cient of simple correlation between the outputs of each budgetary stage.
Danziger, in his study of the British Municipal Budgeting, utilized
multiple regression techniques in investigating the relationship among
the budgetary participants.

Elmore, in his study of the South Carolina

budgetary process, used the annual percentage changes technique and
simple correlation to study the relationship between the participants.
Also, he used the regression analysis technique to explain the effects
24
of multiple variables on budgetary changes.

The present study

employs a combination of these techniques to describe and explain the
relationships between the participants in Saudi Arabian governmental
budgetary process.
24
For detailed discussion of these studies, please see Chapter II.
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The Coefficient of Simple Correlation is employed in the present
study to investigate the relationship between the dependent variable
(budget expansion) and the independent variables (agency acquisitive
ness, Ministry of Finance support, estimated revenue expansion, actual
revenue expansion and spending efficiency).

Specifically, the Coeffi

cients of Simple Correlation between the dependent variable and inde
pendent variables were computed for each of the 26 agencies (cross-time
analysis).

The agencies were also grouped by types of services, and

the Coefficients of Simple Correlation between the dependent and inde
pendent variables were computed for each of the five types (Aggregate
Data Analysis).

These correlation coefficients were examined to make

inferences concerning relationships of the dependent and independent
variables in order to test Hypothesis No. 3.
Regression analysis is also used in the study to measure the
ability of the independent variables to explain the variations in the
dependent variable.

This technique was used by Davis, Dempster and

Wildavsky to explain the federal budgetary behavior of the United
States by Danziger to explain the relationships among budget partici
pants in British municipal budgeting, and by Elmore to explain the
nature of the relationships in the South Carolina Budgetary process.
Regression analysis extends simple correlation analysis to allow the
measurement of associations between more than one independent variable
and to test for the statistical significance of such associations.
Thus, regression analysis was used to make inferences concerning the
factor(s) that affect Saudi Arabian budget expansion. Step-wise
regression was performed for each of the six years (cross-sectional
analysis).
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Data and Variables
Quantitative budgetary data were collected from all nondefense Saudi Arabian governmental agencies for the fiscal years
1973/74 through 1978/79.

The period was chosen to represent rich

and uncertain environment. Prior to 1973 per capita income in
Saudi Arabia was below $900, figures used by Wildavsky as a minimum
in characterizing rich environment.

During the 1974 period, oil

prices rose significantly and per capita income rose to over
25
$6,000.

Thus, Saudi Arabia can be characterized as a poor and

uncertain environment prior to the study period and a rich and
uncertain environment during the study period.
Each agency must meet the following criteria to be included
in this study:
(1) the agency must be non-defense.
(2) Agency data throughout the period of the study must be
available.
(3) The agency must not have any major structural changes
throughout the period of the study.
A total of 26 agencies met the above criteria for inclusion in
this study.

Two other agencies were included in testing the magnitude

of change in budgetary allocations due to their data availability.

25
U. S. Department of State, Foreign Economic Trends and Their
Implication for the United States, International Marketing
Information Series, No. 74-069, July 1974 and No. 78-054, May 1978.
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data for each agency for each fiscal year consisted of:
(1) The original agency's planned requests.
(2) The original budgetary allocations excluding any supple
mental requests.
(3) The original budgetary allocations for salaries, for
general expenditures, and for other expenditures and projects.
(4) The total budgetary appropriations approved by the Council,
of Ministers.
(5) The total supplemental appropriations.
(6) The total actual expenditures.
The data for each fiscal year consisted of total government
estimated and actual revenues.
Arabian records.

The data were collected from Saudi

These records were the government original budget

documents (Budgets of 1973/74 through 1978/79; the annual reports of
the Audit Bureau (1973/74 through 1978/79); Statistical Year Book 1978;
and the five-years development plans 1970 and 1975. The variables used
in this part of the study are operationally defined as follows:
Independent Variables
(1) Agency Acquisitiveness (AA) =

^8,t-l
where:
REQ
8>t

= The original planned request for agency g for i'rl:;cal
year t.

APP
g,t—l

= The total Council of Ministers appropriations for
agency g for fiscal year t-1.
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(2) Ministry of Finance Support (MFS) =
ALL

„

APP „ .
g,t-l
where:
ALL
S> £

= The original budgetary allocation for agency g
for fiscal year t.

(3) Spending Efficiency (SE) =
AE t -1
g» ~
APPg,t-l
„ i
where:
AE
.
6» t—l

= The total actual expenditures for agency g for
fiscal year t-1.

(4) Estimated Revenue Expansion (ERE) =
ER„
ARt-l

where:
ERfc

= The total government estimated revenue for fiscal
year t.

ARt

- The total government actual revenue for fiscal
year t-1.

(5) Actual Revenue Expansion (ARE) =
AR.
^t-l
where:
AR

= The total government actual revenue for fiscal year
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Dependent Variable
Budget Expansion (BE) =
APPg.t
„
APP . ..
g,t-l
where:
APP .
S.t

= The total Council of Ministers
budgetary appropriations for agency
g for fiscal year t-1.

The next chaper presents the results of the interviews and the
quantitative analysis described in this chapter.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

This chapter is organized into two sections.

The first section

is devoted to reporting the results of the open-end interviews with
major participants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process.
The analysis of the quantitative budget data is reported in the second
section.

The conclusions suggested by each research tool are stated

separately and then considered together.

I.

The Open-End Interview Results

One major objective of using the open-end interview as a
research tool was to provide a description of the budgetary process of
the Saudi Arabian government.

The second objective was to describe and

analyze the role perception of the major budgetary participants.

The

results of those interviews are organized according to the interview
objectives.
A.

The Formal Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process;
Descriptive Analysis
To obtain a description of the current formal Saudi Arabian

governmental budgetary process, the interviwer asked the study subjects to state the formal budgetary procedures.

Specifically, the DBAs

and SBAs of each agency were asked the following questions:
(1) How does your agency go about drawing its annual budgetary
request?
76
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(2) How many people and work hours are involved with the
development of your agency's request?
(3) After you have submitted your agency's request to the
general budget affairs, what does your office do?
(4) After the agency's budget is approved, what does your
office do?
The OBFs and SBFs were asked:
(1) How does your office review and approve each agency's
annual budget?
(2) How does your office review and approve the whole govern
mental budget?
(3) How many people and work hours are involved with the devel
opment of the governmental budget?
(4) After approving the governmental budget, what role does
your office have in the budget execution?
The responses of each group to the above questions were analyzed
to determine if any pattern existed among them.

These responses were

verified through personal observation and a review of the official bud
getary regulations.

The results were organized for each cycle of the

budgetary process in order to simplify the presentation.
1.

The Formulation Cycle
The five-year development plan (FYDP) is considered by most of

the OBFs and SBFs interviewed as the first step in the formulation of
the country's budget.

Concerning the annual budget, this document

outlines the general objectives of each governmental organization,
specifies the detailed projects and programs to achieve these

objectives, and forecasts the financial requirements for these projects
and programs.

The FYDP is prepared every five years by the Ministry of

Planning with the cooperation of all governmental organizations; it is
submitted to the Council of Ministers and finally to the King for final
approval.

The plan then becomes compulsory for all governmental

organizations.
The Council of Ministers Resolution No. 565, dated May 15,
1975, required all Ministries and independent agencies to comply with
the contents of the FYDP in preparing their annual budget.

This reso

lution required the budget department of the Ministry of Finance to
allocate the required funds for the projects and programs in the plan
through cooperation and coordination with the central planning organ
ization (which became the Ministry of Planning) and the concerned
Ministries or independent agencies.

Thus, officially, the FYDP fur

nishes the basic outline for the formulation of the country's annual
budget.

But the results of the interview suggested the difficulty of

adherence to the plan in preparing annual budgets of agencies.

Some

of the study subjects attributed this difficulty to the rapid changes
in the governmental economy, while others cited other reasons such as:
"Mack of sufficient accounting systems or lack of qualified personnel.
The results of these interviews reveal that the first actual
step in the formulation of the country's annual budget is at the budget
department of the Ministry of Finance (BDF).

At the beginning of each

fiscal year the BDF submits a report to the Minister of Finance.

This

report is prepared with the cooperation of both the revenue department
of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning.

The major
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objectives of this report are to summarize the economic conditions of
the country; to outline the degree of adherence to the FYDP and to
suggest any necessary changes to this plan; to forecast the next year's
revenues; and to recommend the ways of spending the revenues.

The

Minister of Finance discusses this report with concerned government
officials.

After approval, this report furnishes the basic guidelines

in preparing the country's next year's budget.
Approximately eight months before the beginning of each fiscal
year, the BDF issues directives outlining all financial policies as
well as major procedures which the agencies are to follow in preparing
the estimate of their next year's budgets.

Most of the responses of

the various agencies' DBA and OBA suggested that these directives are
the most important guidelines that they follow in preparing the esti
mate of their agency's annual budget.

These directives outline speci

fic instructions in estimating each chapter of the budget.
The second step of budget formulation starts at the government
agencies.

After receiving the Ministry of Finance directive, the

budget or fiscal director of each agency issues instructions to all
agency departments to prepare an estimate of their actual needs for
the coming fiscal year.

Each of the agency departments submits an

estimate of their departmental needs for the coming fiscal year. The
general director of each agency then forms a committee to collate all
departmental needs and to make financial decisions on the programs
and projects to be included in the agency's request for the next
fiscal year. The fiscal requirements to execute these projects and
programs as well as the estimated cost of salaries, general
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expenditures, and other expenditures are projected on the basis of the
Ministry of Finance directives.

These projections then become the

agency requests which are submitted to the BDF for review.
As directed by the Ministry of Finance, the agency request must
be comprised of four chapters.
allowances and compensations.

Chapter I is devoted to salaries,
Chapter II included the agency's

general expenditures such as furniture, utilities, rents and so on.
Chapter III is called "other expenditures" and is devoted to expendi
tures for specific purposes.
two categories:

Chapter IV, "projects/1 is divided into

Under-contruction Projects and New Projects.

The first three chapters are broken down into heads and sub
heads.

In Chapter IV, each project is a separate heading.

The

agency's requests for Chapters I, II and III must include a justified
estimate of each head and sub-head.

In addition, the agency request

must include a summary of spending efficiency to date for each head
and sub-head, last year's budget, and the agency organization chart.
Chapter IV requests must include detailed descriptions of the status
of each project under consideration and the estimated cost of their
completion.

In addition, it must include justifications for each new

project.
Although the agencies usually comply with these standardized
procedures in preparing their estimated requests, the results of the
interviews suggested that most of the government agencies face major
problems in preparing their requests.

The following factors are often

cited by most of the participants as the reason for this phenomenon:
(1) The lack of clarified objectives.

Even though the FYDP
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specifies the objectives of each governmental organization,
these objectives are considered broad and difficult to meet.
(2) The lack of sufficient accounting systems to generate
feedback information.

Hence, most of the government agencies

prepare their requests without knowledge of their actual expen
ditures or vital statistical information.
(3) The lack of qualified personnel.

The interview showed

that most of the DBA and SBA in the government agencies lack
the special education in preparing the budget.
(4) The rapid changes in the economic conditions of the country.
But in general most of these obstacles are recognized by the
government, and various special committees have been formed to find the
proper solutions to these obstacles.
2.

Review Cycle
Each governmental agency must submit its budget requests for

Chapter I, II, III and part of Chapter IV (new projects) to the budget
department of the Ministry of Finance no later than six months prior
to the beginning of each fiscal year. The deadline for submitting the
second part of Chapter IV (projects under construction) is three
months before the beginning of each fiscal year.
When the budget department receives the requests of every
agency, this department calls a meeting of each agency representative.
Usually the senior staff officers of the budget department represents
the Ministry of Finance and the director of the budget or fiscal
department of each agency represents the agencies in these meetings.
The agency representative must justify every item in his agency's
request.
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When mutual agreement between these representatives is achieved,
a comprehensive proposed budget is prepared.

If there is sharp dis

agreement among the representatives, the matter is submitted to the
Deputy of the Ministry of Finance for the final decision.

Officially

there are specific instructions for reviewing each agency request, but
most of the study subjects stressed a lack of efficiency in conducting
these reviews.

Again, the same obstacles that faced the agency in. pre

paring its requests also faced the representatives in negotiating the
agency budget.
After reviewing the requests of each agency, the DBF organizes
the results of the reviews and prepares the proposed government budget
for the next fiscal year. The Deputy Minister of Finance and Budget
Affairs then calls a meeting with the Deputy Minister of Planning and
the Deputy Minister of the concerned agency.
tives of this meeting:

There are several objec

to further discuss the agency's proposed

budget; to investigate the degree of compliance of this proposed
budget with the FYDP; to analyze the impact of each government program
and to project the country's economy; and to make an extensive effort
to balance the budget.

The product of this meeting is then submitted

to the Ministry of Finance, who calls extensive meetings with the OBF
and other concerned officials to discuss the final proposed budget.
Then this proposed budget is submitted to the Council of Ministers for
approval.
3.

Approval Cycle
As mentioned before, the proposed budget has been approved

indirectly by the ministers of each agency through their representatives
in the reviewing cycle.

The approval cycle is used only to confirm
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the proposed budget.

Also, the budget is proposed in compliance with

the policy issued by the cabinet and the King during the fiscal year.
These policies determine in detail what should and should not
be approved in the review cycle, which is begun upon submission of the
proposed budget to the Council of Ministers.

In a special meeting

headed by His Majesty the King, the Council of Ministers discusses the
proposed budget.

After approval, the King singes the budget decree,

and the budget becomes a law that must be followed by all governmental
agencies.
4.

Execution and Audit Cycle"^
Execution and audit is the final cycle of the Saudi Arabian

budgetary process, commencing with the beginning of the fiscal year
(the first day of Rajjab, or approximately May 5).

The current

government budget is composed of two schedules, Schedule A and B.
Schedule A is for revenue and Schedule B is for expenditures.

Schedule

A is classified by a source of revenues which is disclosed in the
budget in lump sums and in details.

Schedule B (expenditures) is

classified into titles, a separate one assigned for each ministry or
agency.
The title is further classified into sections.

A section is

assigned to a major department and each section is composed of four
chapters, as discussed earlier.

The budget also includes the total

expenditures for each of the sections of the economy, which makes it
compatible with the FYDP organizations.

Additionally, comparative

figures for the last year's budget are disclosed for each of the budget
schedules.
"'"This cycle will be discussed in general, but the details involve
the financial system, which is outside the scope of this paper.

84
The sources of the government revenues usually include royalties
from oil; income taxes from oil companies, other companies and indivi
duals; custom duties; services fees; and other miscellaneous sources.
Oil revenues comprise approximately 97 percent of the total government
revenues in the fiscal year 1979/1980.

The responsibility of the oil

revenue estimation, control and collection is placed primarily on the
Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry of Finance coordinates and cooper

ates with other government agencies, such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Petroleum in this
effort.

The Department of General Revenues in the Ministry of Finance

keeps accurate records of each revenue item.

Other sources of revenue

(approximately 3 percent) are estimated, controlled, and collated
directly by the concerned agencies.
Approximately two weeks after approval of the budget, the BD'P
notifies each agency of its budget.

Once the agency receives the

budget, the agency proceeds to use its funds according to the financial
and accounting instructions.

The appropriations of each expenditure

chapter, head, and sub-heads may not be used for purposes other than
the ones that are specified in the budget decree and the Ministry of
Finance instructions.

The agency is responsible for keeping a detailed

record to control its spending activities.
The financial regulations, within certain limits, allow shifts
in the original appropriations.
outside the scope of this paper.

The details of these regulations are
The interview results show that most

original appropriations of the government agencies are frequently
changed during the fiscal year.

These changes occur by transferring

funding throughout the agency or by supplemental appropriations.
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Uncertainty and the lack of a scientific basis for budget formulation
are cited by most of the study subjects as the major factors for
these changes.
The major objective of the Audit Stage is largely to guarantee
the compliance of government agencies with the provisions of the
budget, the government policies, and the financial regulations.
Specifically, it is to ensure that the agency's budget was spent for
the predetermined purposes.
The auditing function is performed simultaneously during the
fiscal year by both the Ministry of Finance and the Audit Bureau.

The

Ministry of Finance is responsible for pre-audit while the Audit
Bureau is responsible for post-audit.
The pre-audit function is performed through a representative
who is assigned to each agency to ensure that the agency complies with
the accounting and financial regulations prior to any fund payments.
The pre-audit function is also performed through the budget department
of the Ministry of Finance to guarantee that the agency is in compli
ance with the provisions of the budget.
The post-audit function is vested in the Audit Bureau, which
was established as an independent agency in 1953.

The major objective

of the post-audit function is to investigate the compliance of all
government agencies with the
financial regulations.

provisions of the budget and with the

The results of these audits are then submitted

in an annual report to the Council of Ministers.
Figure No. 6 summarizes the major formal Saudi Arabian govern
mental budgetary process described above.
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Figure 6. Summary of the Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process
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Figure 6. Summary of the Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process (Continued)
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B.

Description and Analysis of the Budgetary Participants' Role
Perceptions
This study utilized direct open-end interviews with the major

participants to describe and analyze the role perception of partici
pants.

Roles to be described and analyzed are primarily those of the

director of budget or fiscal department of each agency (DBA), the staff
of the budget or fiscal department of each agency (SBA), the senior
staff officers of the budget department of the Ministry of Finance
(OBF), and the staff of the budget department of the Ministry of
Finance (SBF).

The interviewer stressed the following points during

each interview:
(1) The formal and informal training of the participants.
(2) The role of each participant in each budget cycle.
(3) The decision criteria used in each budget cycle.
(4) The effectiveness of these criteria.
(5) The formal and informal contacts with other participants.
(6) The results of these contacts.
1.

The Requestor Group:

Role Description and Analysis

The origin of development and orchestration of the Saudi Arabian
budgetary process is in the agencies' budget or fiscal offices.

In

some agencies, this responsibility is divided between both departments.
The budget department formulates requests, while the fiscal department
executes the budget.
both duties.

In other agencies, the fiscal department performs

Thus, the budget or fiscal officials are considered the

main participants in the agency budgetary process.

Following is a

summary of the results of the open-end interviews conducted with
fifteen DBAs and fifteen SBAs.

89
Formal and Informal Background Training
The absence of skilled and highly trained budgetary professionals
was the rule not the exception in each of the departments.

Of the fif

teen DBAs interviewees, only four had college degrees, and only six had
professional training in fiscal and budgeting fields.

The formal edu

cation of the DBAs ranged from secondary school to university level.
The experience of these DBAs ranged from five to fifteen years.
most of the DBAs had "on the job" experience.

But

Nine of the directors

had at least one intensive course in budgeting and accounting.
The vast majority of the SBAs also lacked professional skills.
Of fifteen SBAs interviewed, only one had a college degree, and only
four had had professional training in budget and accounting fields.
The formal education of the SBAs ranged from secondary school to col
lege level.

Most of the informal training of the SBAs was composed of

"on the job training."

This experience ranged from two to nine years.

Six of the SBAs had had an intensive course in budgeting and accounting.
The evidence suggests that the DBAs and OBAs lack the necessary
and professional skills to perform their duties.

This problem has

discouraged any budgetary innovations and reforms.
The Role of the DBAs and SBAs in the Budgetary Process
When asked to describe their role in the budgetary process, most
of the DBAs viewed their role as "planning and budget coordinators"
rather than "decision makers."

They considered themselves "budget and

financial matter specialists" in addition "defenders of the agency's
requests."

The following two excerpts typify responses of the DBAs:

Q.

What is your role in the budgetary process?

A.

My role, as the director of the budget department, is
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composed of the following functions:
(1) To coordinate and prepare the agency's five-year
development plan (FYDP).
(2) To represent the agency in the discussions of this
plan at the Ministry of Planning.
(3) To determine the degree of agency compliance with
the FYDP.
(4) To furnish the basic statistical and feedback informa
tion to the department heads.
(5) To coordinate and prepare the agency's annual
requests.
(6) To represent the agency in the budget reviews at the
Ministry of Finance.
(7) To provide professional consultation to the agency in
budget and financial matters.
Q.

Does your role include any part of budget execution?

A.

Not directly.

This office was established last year to

coordinate budget and planning activities.

The execution func

tion is primarily the responsibility of the fiscal department.
Q.

Do you become involved in the budget decision making?

A.

Actually, no.

My role is confined to coordination among

the various departments in preparing their requests.
my responsibility to make budgetary decisions.

It is not

I am only a

specialist who provides the basic information and explains the
budgetary and financial regulations.

After I receive the

departments' request, I coordinate them and send them to a
special committee. I represent this department on this
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committee, which is headed by the general director.

This

committee makes the major budgetary and planning decisions.
The other DBA also stressed the same role:
Q.

What is your role in the budgetary process?

A.

The department of fiscal affairs is concerned mainly with

all budgeting and financial matters, such as preparing the
annual agency requests, representing the agency in the budget
reviews at the Ministry of Finance, and supervising execution
of the budget.
Q.

Does your department involve itself in the preparation of

the FYDP?
A.

Yes. Since we do not have a separate budget department,

this department helps in the preparation of the agency FYDP.
We furnish the basic statistical and financial information to
various departments.

At the same time, this office is respon

sible for determining the degree of compliance of the annual
budget with the FYDP.
Q.

So, your department is responsible for both budget formu

lation and execution.
A.

As I have explained before, ,yes.

But the agency plans to

establish a separate budget department.

Then both the planning

and preparation of the budget will be the responsibility of this
department.

This trend is evident in almost every government

agency. I personally approve of this trend because this depart
ment cannot perform both functions.

Also, the separation of

budget formulation from budget extension is good internal
control.
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Q.

Do you make any budgetary decisions?

A.

No.

This is the responsibility of the special committee.

This committee usually is headed by the agency's general
director.

I serve on this committee with the other departmental

directors.
When asked to describe their role in the budgetary process, most
of the SBAs considered it to be "assistant to the DBAs." They were
mainly concerned with preparation of the necessary information to help
in the formulation and review of the budget.
The role of the SBA who worked in the budget department differed
slightly from the role of SBA in the fiscal department. The first was
mainly concerned with planning and budgeting matters, the latter with
both budgeting and accounting matters.

Most of the SBAs viewed them

selves as experts in budget procedures.

The following excerpts typi

fied the SBAs responses:
Q.

What is your role in the budgetary process?

A.

My job, as the supervisor of the accounting department, is

mainly concerned with budget execution.

Since we do not have

separate budget departments, this office is responsible for
providing the DBA with the necessary feedback information.
Q.

Then you actually are involved in budget formulation?

A.

Not directly.

We provide the information and prepare the

necessary forms, and the committee makes most of the decisions.
These excerpts summarize the role of the requestor group in the
budgetary process.

Obviously, the budget or fiscal department is con

sidered by most of the DBAs and SBAs as the place for formulation and
execution of the agency's budget.

The budget or fiscal department is
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concerned only with coordination among the agency departments in
formulating both the agency's plans and requests.

Although this

department does not involve itself in the decision-making process,
most of the DBAs are members of the agency committee that makes most
of these decisions.

Moreover, the DBAs represent the agency in the

budget review, so they also consider their role to be that of defender
of the agency requests.

In addition, the fiscal department is respon

sible for the budget execution.
In summary, the budget or fiscal department is perceived mainly
a service department rather than a decision-making department.

The

responsibility for the budgetary decision-making is relegated to
special committees.
Decision Criteria and Its Effectiveness
The FYDP outlines the general objectives for each government
agency and specifies the projects and the programs to be performed by
each governmental agency for the next five fiscal years.

The plan

furnishes the basic grounds for most of the budgetary decisions.

In

addition, the Ministry of Finance issues an annual directive outlining
in detail the procedures to be followed by each agency in preparing
its annual requests. In spite of the extensive effort by both the
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance to standardize the
criteria in most of the budgetary decisions, the calculations of the
agency's requests is the most complex step in the budgetary process.
This complexity leads most of the government agencies to exaggerate
their annual requests.

The vast majority of the DBAs and SBAs

attributed this complexity to the following causes:
(1) The lack of clarified objectives.

Even though these
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objectives are spelled out in the FYDP, most of the DBAs and
SBAs considered them broad and difficult to meat.
(2) The lack of sufficient accounting systems to generate the
basic feedback information.

Some of the DBAs prepared their

agency requests without complete knowledge of the actual expen
ditures during the year.
(3) The lack of qualified personnel.

This obstacle was con

sidered by most of the DBAs and SBAs as the major cause of the
complexity in calculation.
(4) The rapid changes in the economic environment in the
country.
The interview revealed that the decision criteria used by the
agencies differed according to the types of expenditures.

Salaries

and general expenditures (Chapter I and II of the budget) are usually
estimated through the use of historical precedent.

The other expendi

tures (Chapter III) are estimated according to the agencies' actual
needs.

The estimation of the project's cost (Chapter IV) was consid

ered by the majority of the DBAs and SBAs as the most difficult task
in the budget formulation.

This difficulty led most governmental

agencies to exaggerate the cost of these projects.

The following

examples typify the responses of most of the DBAs and SBAs:
Q.

What criteria do you use in evaluating each department

request?
A.

As I mentioned before, this department does not involve

itself in the decision part of the budget.

But I am a member

of the committee that makes these decisions.

According to the

Council of Ministers resolution #565, each agency must comply
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with the guidelines of the FYDP in preparing its annual budget.
But it is a major problem to adhere to these guidelines because
we do not have the qualified personnel to give us the necessary
feedback information. Neither can we adjust to the rapid changes
in the economic conditions.

These problems have led us in pre

vious years to overestimate or underestimate our requests sub
stantially.

In some years, we have excess funds in our budget.

In other years, we have asked for more supplemental funds.

In

the committee meetings, we tried to follow the Ministry of
Finance regulations in preparation of the agency requests.
Salaries and general expenditures are generally estimated for
the next year on the basis of last year's appropriations and
actual needs. Since Chapter III is devoted to other expendi
tures, these expenditures are estimated on the basis of actual
needs.

We include in our request most of the projects that are

outlined in the FYDP in addition to modifications of these pro
jects.

But the cost estimation of these projects is the most

difficult step.

This difficulty is mainly due to the lack of a

sufficient accounting system and ill-qualified personnel as
well as the rapid changes in the country's economic conditions.
Thus, we end up over- or underestimating our requests for
projects.
When asked about the effectiveness of the decision criteria,
the majority (approximately 70%) of the DBAs' and SBAs' responses were
negative.

They called for an increase in the quality and quantity of

the budget department personnel, substantial improvements in the
accounting systems, and specific and clear objectives and guidelines.
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When asked if their agencies requested supplementary funds
during the fiscal year, most replied affirmatively (approximately 76%).
They attributed this phenomenon to the imprecision in estimating the
costs of their projects.

The following example typifies the response

of most of the DBAs and SBAs:
Q.

During the execution stage, does your agency request

supplementary funds?
A.

Yes.

And why?

But the percentage of these supplemental funds has

decreased during the last few years.

As I mentioned before, we

may underestimate the cost of some projects and later we have to
ask for more funds.

Or we may underestimate the project costs

and then we cannot spend the budget funds for these projects.
The inflation rate and the capacity to spend these funds are
the major causes of these phenomena.
In summary, the majority of the budgetary decisions were not
based on well-defined criteria.
budgetary decision process.

This leads to the complexity in the

Even though the regulations called for

the utilization of the FYDP, the last year's appropriations, the
spending efficiency, and the agency's actual need, the guidelines were
not fully followed.

The complexity of the budgetary decision-making

results in the overestiznatiasis or underestimations of most of the
agencies' requests. Furthermore, the lack of qualified personnel and
of modern data-gathering procedures discouraged any attempts at new
innovations in the budgeting process (such as PPBs or ZBB).
Formal and Informal Contacts with Other Participants and the Results
of These Contacts
As discussed above, the DBAs considered their role as to be
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that of "defenders of the agency's request."

This role compels the

DBAs to make formal and informal contacts with other officials in order
to justify their agency requests.

Also, the lack of well defined

budgetary decision criteria leads most of the government agencies to
utilize

these contacts as strategical maneuvers to justify their

requests.

The vast majority (approximately 93%) of the DBAs described

their formal and informal contacts in the affirmative.

A typical

response follows:
Q.

Are you formally or informally in contact with other

budget participants concerning your requests?
A.

Definitely, yes. In the formulation stage I contact all

agency departments to explain the general guidelines for pre
paring their needs.

Also, I coordinate efforts among these

departments to prepare the agency requests.

In the reviewing

stage, I represent the agency in the Ministry of Finance.
these meetings, I have to justify the agency's requests.

At
But

most of the time I do not have the necessary feedback informa
tion to justify the agency's request.

Thus, I use negotiation

techniques, such as compromising to reach the final figure.
Actually, the informal contacts with the reviewers are the most
effective means to inform them about our needs.
The interviews revealed that the DBAs must resort to "games" and
strategic maneuvers to secure the Ministry of Finance approval of their
agency requests.
their requests.

The most common strategic maneuver is to overestimate
One of the DBAs said:

"....Based on my previous experiences, we have to ask for
100 to get 50."

-S»,

98
I

Another "game" used by the DBAs is to make personal friendships with
the budget reviewers.
In summary, strategic maneuvers are used extensively by the
DBAs to justify their requests.

This phenomenon is attributed to the

lack of specific deicsion criteria and well-defined objectives.
Furthermore, the uncertainty of future needs compelled most of the
agencies to overestimate their requests.
2.

The Giver Group:

Role Description and Analysis

In the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process, the
Ministry of Finance has the prime responsibility for organizing and
collecting agency requests and preparing the country's final proposed
budget.

This responsibility is centralized in the budget department

of the Ministry of Finance.

The official of this department represents

the main participant in reviewing agency requests.

Following is a

summary of the results of the open-end interviews conducted with seven
senior officers of the budget department (OBF) and with ten staff
members of that department (SBF).
Formal and Informal Background Training
Unlike the agency budget officials, most of the OBFs have both
extensive formal and informal training backgrouns in government budget
ing. However, the number of these professionals is not adequate to
review all the government agency requests in the allowed time span.

Of

the seven OBFs interviewed, four had master degrees in public adminis
tration, and two had some college education.

Most of the OBFs had

professional training in financial, accounting, end budgeting fields.
Their "on the job" experience ranged from eight to twenty-two years.
Although the SBFs did not have the same formal and informal
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training backgrounds as the OBFs, their training is considered ade
quate.

But again the lack of SBF staff members is insufficient to

carry out their responsibilities.
had some college education.

Of the ten SNFs interviewed, four

Most of the SBFs had at least one course

in accounting and in budgeting fields.

Their "on the job" experience

ranged from two to ten years.
It is clear that the budget department of the Ministry of
Finance, unlike the budget department of the agencies, does not lack
the professional personnel.

However, it does have an inadequate number

of personnel to perform its functions.
The Role of OBFs and SBFs in the Budgetary Process
The major role of the OBFs in the Saudi Arabian governmental
budgetary process can be more accurately viewed as that of "cutter"
than "efficient economizers."

This role is similar to the role of the

budget review officers that Schick described in his study of the con
trol patterns in state budget execution.

The budget review officers

interviewed by Schick indicated that the watch-dog function was an
accurate description of actual budget review.

He attributed this

phenomenon to the built-in pressure for budget expansion and the feel
ing that consequently there must be a specialized agency with the task
2

of saying "No."

The role of the OBFs in the Saudi Arabian govern

mental budgetary process is also similar to the role of the members of
state budget and control that are described by Elmore in his study of
the South Carolina budgetary process.
3

Elmore viewed their role as

"Gatekeeper of the State Treasury."
2
^Schick, "Control Patterns in State Budget Execution," p. 98.
Elmore, The South Carolina Budgetary Process: Managing the
Model, p. 80.
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The responsibility of reviewing the agency's requests in the
Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process is divided among the OBFs.
Each OBF is primarily responsible for reviewing the agency requests in
one sector of the economy such as the economic resource sector, the
human resources development sector, and so on....After receiving the
agency requests, the OBF calls a meeting with the representative of
each agency. The main purpose of this meeting is to negotiate the bud
get that will be appropriated to the agency for the next fiscal year.
When the two parties come to a mutual agreement, the final proposal is
submitted to the Deputy Minister of Finance for further revision.
Believing that the agency administrators overestimate their
budgets and lacking sufficient feedback information, the majority of
the OBFs (approximately 71%) tend to cut these estimates as much as
possible.

In addition, the inadequate number of OBFs and the time

span are attributable to these attitudes.

The following excerpt

typifies the OBFs responses:
Q.

What is your role in the budgetary process?

A.

Every OBF in this department is responsible primarily for

reviewing all the agency requests in a whole sector of the
economy.

This function includes reviewing the agency's annual

estimate in his section.

Also, it includes the determining of

the degree of compliance of the agency budget to the FYDP.
When I receive the agency's request, I call a meeting with the
agency representative to discuss the request.

In this meeting,

I negotiate with the agency representative in order to reach a
final agreement for each item and project.
in these meetings.

I face many problems

For example:
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(1) Most of the agencies substantially overestimate their
requests without adequate justification; thus, I am forced to
cut these requests substantially.
(2) Feedback information is inadequate to make efficient deci
sion.
(3) Clarified objectives and purposes are lacking.
(4) There are not enough personnel.
(5) The time span to review all the agency requests in my
sector is short.
After reaching a final agreement with the agency representa
tive, I submit it to the Deputy Minister of Finance for a final
revision.
The major role of the SBFs in the Saudi Arabian governmental
budgetary process can be viewed as that of "assistants to the OBFs."
Thus, they are responsible for preparing the feedback information for
the OBFS.

Also, they are responsible for controlling the degree of

the agency's compliance with its budget during the execution stage.
The evidence from the interviews and the personal observations
suggests that the Ministry of Finance plays the most influencial role
in developing the annual government budget.

This role is embodied in

the reviewing, collating, scrutinizing, and finalizing the whole
government budget at both the OBF level and the top official level.
Although there is no formal way of restricting the power of the
Ministry, this power is also shared by the head of the agencies.
this power is restricted by the FYDP.

Also,

In addition, the Ministry must

take into consideration the general policy and desires of both the
Council of Ministers and H. M. the King.

The power of the Ministry of
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Finance was expressed by one OBF as:
"....Almost all of what the Ministry of Finance
recommends will be in the final budget."
The Ministry of Finance is also responsible for preauditing all
government agency spending during the execution stage. Also, it is
the responsibility of the Ministry to control the degree of agency
compliance with both the budget and the FYDP. In addition, the agency
must go through the Ministry of Finance when asking for supplemental
funds or any changes in the original budget appropriations.
The Decision Criteria and Their Effectiveness
The interviews revealed that the decision making during the
review cycle is a very complex process because of poorly defined
criteria and objectives, the lack of a sufficient data base, the time
limitation, and the small number of personnel.
As discussed in Chapters II and III, the budgetary decisions in
rich and certain countries are often incremental and are considered
simple.

In poor and certain countries, the certainty creates the
(i
simplicity in the budgetary decision making. The combination of both
poverty and uncertainty causes complexity in budgetary decisions in
poor and uncertain countries.

Unlike those poor and uncertain count

ries, the complexity of decision making in the Saudi Arabian govern
mental budgetary process is caused not by the lack of resources but by
insufficient guidelines and well-defined objectives.
The interviews showed that the decision criteria in the review
cycle vary according to the type of expenditures.

The following is a

summary of the most common criteria mentioned:
(1) Salaries, General Expenditures, and Other Expenditures
The interviews showed that reviewing the agency salaries

103
most of the time and effort of the OBFs. Historical precedent
and the actual needs of the agency for human resources were the
major criteria in reviewing these types of expenditures.
Chapter II (general expenditures) were estimated primarily on
the basis of the previous year expenditures.

The decisions for

other expenditures appropriations were based on actual needs and
previous year spending efficiency.
(2) Projects Under Construction and New Projects
A large proportion of the Saudi Arabian budget is devoted
each year to capital projects.

Thus, an extensive effort has

been employed to develop specific criteria as the basis for
making the major decisions for this type of expenditure.

In

addition, the last few years have witnessed an improvement in
the government accounting system. The most common criteria
used by the OBFs were the FYDP, the agency's execution capacity,
previous year spending efficiency, and the general economic
conditions of the country.

But no matter the degree of precise

criteria, the execution of these projects encounters the same
problems that were mentioned by Wildavsky in poor and uncertain
countries:
"Poor countries have trouble getting the work done.
Projects may be delayed because the weather is bad,
because necessary materials have not arrived from
abroad, because plans were improperly drawn, because
skilled labor cannot be found, because of excessive
paper work...."4
For these reasons and many others, most of the projects
cannot be executed during the fiscal year. Thus, a major
4
Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Process,
p. 149.
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complexity exists in the decision making for the next year's
budget.
Formal and Informal Contacts with the Other Participants and Their
Results
The interview results showed that the OBFs and SBFs used formal
and informal contacts with agency officials to simplify the process of
negotiations.

Again, the lack of clarified criteria and sufficient

information leads most of the OBFs to utilize this technique to arrive
at a mutual agreement.

Most of the OBFs stressed the importance of

informal contacts with agency officials.

These contacts helped to

clarify formal instructions and simplify the process of regulations.
Conclusions
The interview results suggest the following conslusions:
1.

The Saudi Arabian government budget is formulated in a piecemeal

and fragmented fashion.

The budget or fiscal department of each agency

is the primary place for developing and orchestrating its proposed
request. However, both the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of
Finance play major roles in this process.
The Ministry of Planning, through the FYDP, outlines the agen
cies' general objectives, specifies the agencies' programs and projects,
and furnishes a rough estimate of the financial requirements to execute
these projects and programs.

After approval by the Council of Ministers

and by H. M. the King, the FYDP becomes compulsory.

Thus, all govern

ment agencies must comply with the contents of the FYDP in preparing
their annual budgets.

The Ministry of Finance, through numerous direc

tives, established the guidelines that must be followed in the formula
tion of the budget.
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The budget review is centralized in the budget department of
the Ministry of Finance.

After hearing the point of view of the agen

cies through their representatives, this department organizes each
agency's estimates into a unified, final form. Then the proposed budget
for the entire country is extensively reviewed by a special committee.
This committee is commonly headed by the Minister of Finance. It is in
this committee that most of the final budgetary decisions are made.
Thus, it would seem that the Ministry of Finance influences the output
of the final budgetary decision more than any other government organi
zation.
The Council of Ministers, as the main legislative body, has the
power to approve the country's annual budget. However, since the
Ministry of Finance takes into consideration the general policies of
the Council in preparing the final proposed budget, the Council members,
through their representatives, also participate in budget formulation.
The existence of the approval cycle seems to be for legitimacy purposes
only.

However, any major changes in the original budget must be
e
approved by the Council of Ministers.
2.

In all fifteen agencies, the directors and the staff of the

budget department lack the necessary skills and professional training
to perform their duties.

This problem does not exist in the budget

department of the Ministry of Finance, which does, however, face a
shortage in staff that can review agency requests in the allotted time.
Both problems have contributed to the lack of innovations in the budget
ary process.
3.

The majority of the DBAs view their role as "coordinators" among

the agency departments in the formulation of both the agency's plans

•N,.
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and annual budget requests.

Although budgetary decisions are made by

a special committee, most of the DBAs and involved in making these
decisions through their participation on this committee.
DBAs represent the agency in budget review hearings.

Moreover, the

Thus, most of the

DBAs consider their role as "defender" of the agency's requests.

The

SBAs prepare the necessary information to aid in budget formulation and
review.
The role of DBFs can be viewed as that of "cutter" more than
"efficiency economizer."

Most of the OBFs tend to cut agency requests,

believing that the agencies exaggerate their estimations.

Although

these officials do not have the authority to make final decisions,
their views carry considerable weight.
4.

Complexity in calculation is commonly encountered throughout

the budgetary process.

However, the degree of complexity varies accord

ing to the type of expenditure.

Salaries and general expenditures are

estimated mainly on the basis of both actual needs and prior budgetary
appropriations.

Thus, the majority of budgetary decisions for these

types of expenditures are incremental in nature.

Moreover, determining

projects priority and cost is the most complex stage in the budget
process.
The lack of clarified objectives, specific criteria, an effi
cient accounting system, qualified personnel, rapid changes in the
country's economy, and numerous problems in the execution of projects
are the major causes for this complexity.

Finally, the complexity in

project budget calculation induces most of the government agencies to
over- or underestimate the cost of their projects.

The result is

either a decrease in the agencies' spending efficiency ratios or the
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creation of supplemental budgets.
The estimation of revenue is a very easy task in the budgetary
process since oil is the main source of government revenues.

Although

balancing the budget is a very important step in the budgetary process,
the cumulative wealth of the government is often used to cover any
shortages in the annual revenue.
5.

The Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process exhibits a high

level of strategizing.

Spending agencies tend to exaggerate their

estimates, knowing that the Ministry of Finance will alter their esti
mates.

The agencies' representatives utilize formal and informal con

tacts to justify their requests.

However, the frequency of strategic

maneuvers is less than in poor and uncertain countries because uncer
tainty always increases the frequency of strategic maneuvers. In those
countries, the spending agencies will maneuver continuously, and the
Ministry of Finance must tend to cut the agencies' requests dramati
cally to remain viable.

But the economic wealth in Saudi Arabia

lessens the degree of strategizing.

The spending agencies can always

ask the Ministry of Finance for supplemental funds if these funds can
be justified.

II.

Quantitative Budgetary Data Analysis

This section presents the results of the second stage of the
research - the analysis of quantitative budgetary data.

Results of

tests to determine the degree of incrementalism in the Saudi Arabian
governmental budgetary process are presented first.

Next, findings

with respect to the existence of supplemental budgeting are detailed.
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The final portion of this section presents results of the quantitative
investigation to determine the influence of factors affecting the
budgetary output.
1.

The Decree of Incrementalism in the Budgetary Process
The first issue investigated in the quantitative phase of the

study was the degree of incrementalism in the Saudi Arabia governmental
budgetary process.

The study investigated the magnitued of budgetary

changes from one year to the next as a means of testing the degree of
incrementalism in a given budgetary process.

The magnitude of change in

budgetary allocation was defined as the ratio of allocation in a given
fiscal year to the allocation in the preceding fiscal year.
To perationalize the test of the degree of incrementalism, three
categories were identified:
I.

"Incremental Process." The magnitude of change in budget

ary allocation ranges from 1.00 to 1.10.
II. "Relatively Incremental Process."

The magnitude of change

in budgetary allocation ranges from 1.11 to 1.30.
III. "Non-Incremental Process." The magnitude of change in
budgetary allocation is greater than 1.30 or less than 1.00.
Table 1 displays the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocation
for all major non-defense agencies (fiscal years 1973/1974 through
1978/1979).
for

As shown, the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocation

69.64 percent (117 cases) of the 168 cases studied clearly were

within the "Non-Incremental Process" range; 22.62 percent (38 cases)
were within the "Relatively Incremental Process" range; and only 7.74
percent (13 cases) were within the "Incremental Process" range.

Also

when viewed by fiscal year, the table reveals that a majority of the
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agencies' budgetary processes were characterized by a "Non-Incremental
Process" during most of the fiscal year studied.
There were only two exceptions. During the 1976-77 fiscal year
slightly less than a majority (46%) of the agencies were in the "non-incremental" category.

Over 54% of the cases were in either the "increment

al" or "relatively incremental" category. The other exception, the
1973-74 fiscal year, might be attributable to the fact that the 1974
increase in oil prices, which is the main source of the government
revenue, was not incorporated in the 1973/1974 budget.

The results in

Table 1 generally support Hypothesis No. 1; hence, the budgetary pro
cess of most Saudi Arabian non-defense agencies can be characterized
as a "Non-Incremental Process."
A further analysis of the data revealed additional insight.
Table 2 shows the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocations by
type of expenditures.

As displayed, the magnitude of changes in

Chapters land II (salaries, and general expenditures, respectively)
allocations for most of the cases studied were within the "increment
al" and "relatively incremental process" ranges. Specifically, the
magnitude of changes in Chapter I allocations for 52.38 percent of the
168 cases were within the "incremental" and "relatively incremental"
ranges, while 47-62 percent were within the "non-incremental" range.
The magnitude of changes in Chapter II allocations for 64.88 percent
of the 168 cases were within the "incremental" and "relatively incre
mental" ranges, and 35.12 percent were within the range of "nonincremental process."
Table 2 also shows that the magnitude of changes in Chapters III
and IV (other expenditures and projects, respectively) allocations for
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TABLE 1. MAGNITUDE OF CHANGES IN BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS FOR ALL MAJOR
NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES FOR FY 1973/74 - FY 1978/79.
RELATIVELY
INCREMENTAL

INCREMENTAL

NON-INCREMENTAL

FISCAL
YEARS

1.0-1.10 ALL ,
t-1

1.11-1.30 ALL_X ^1.0 or>l.30 ALL_X

N

N

1973/74
n=28

7.14

14

50.0

12

42.86

1974/75
n=28

3.57

4

14.29

23

82.14

3.57

27

96.43

8

28.57

13

46.43

7.14

6

21.43

20

71.43

3.57

5

17.86

22

78.57

1975/76
n=28

0

1976/77
n=28

25.0

1977/78
n=28

1978/79
n=28

TOTAL
n=168

MEAN
PERCENTAGE

38

13

117

22.62

7.74

v

69.64

Ill
TABLE 2.

MAGNITUDE OF CHANGES IN BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS FOR ALL MAJOR
NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES, BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURES
DURING THE FY 1973/74 - 1978/79.

INCREMENTAL

RELATIVELY
INCREMENTAL

NON-INCREMENTAL

TYPE OF
1.0-1.10 ALL , 1.11-1.30 ALL (1.0 or>1.30 ALL .
t-1
t-1
t-1
EXPENDITURE
N

N

N

Chapter I.
Salaries
n=168

47

27.98

41

24.40

80

47.62

Chapter II.
General Expenditures
n=168

41

24.40

68

40.48

59

35.12

Chapter III.
Other Expenditures
n=161

43

26.71

37

22.98

81

50.31

Chapter IV.
Projects
n=166

19

11.45

15

9.04

132

79.52
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most of the cases studied were clearly in the "non-incremental pro
cess" range.

In particular, the magnitude of changes in Chap.er III

budgetary allocation for 50.31 percent of the 161 cases were within
the "non-incremental process" range, while the magnitude of changes
in Chapter IV budgetary allocations for 79.52 percent of the 166
cases were within the "non-incremental process" range.
The results in Table 2 suggested that the degree of incrementalism in Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process varied accord
ing to type of expenditure.

The budgetary process for Chapters I and

II can be characterized as either "incremental" or "relatively incre
mental" process, while the budgetary process for Chapters III and IV
are a clear case of "non-incremental" process.
Also, the previous results are supported when the actual expen
ditures were analyzed.

Table 3 contains the magnitude of changes in

actual expenditures for all major non-defense agencies during the
fiscal years 1973/1974 through 1978/1979.

As shown, the magnitude of

changes in actual expenditures for 58.33 percent (98 cases) of the
168 cases were within the "non-incremental process" range; 27.38
(46 cases) were within the "relatively incremental process" range; and
only 14.29 percent (24 cases) were in the range of "incremental
process" range.

Also when analyzed by fiscal years, the table shows

that a majority of the agencies' budgetary processes were characterized
by a "non-incremental process" during most of the fiscal years. Again,
fiscal year 1973/1974 was the only exception.
In summary, the results in Tables 1 and 3 suggested that the
Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process can be characterized in
general as a "non-incremental process."

Also, the findings in Table 2
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TABLE 3.

MAGNITUDE OF CHANGES IN ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR ALL MAJOR
NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES FOR FY 1973/74 - FY 1978/79.

INCREMENTAL

"RFT ATTVFT Y
T^^.7t;,T
INCREMENTAL

NON-INCREMENTAL

FISCAL
1.0-1.10 AE ,
t-1

1.11-1.30 AE . /1.0
or>1.30 AE. .
t-1 N
^
t-1

YEARS
N

%

N

%

N

%

1973/74
n=28

4

14.29

14

50.0

10

35.71

1974/75
n=28

3

10.71

8

28.57

17

60.71

1975/76
n=28

5

17.86

5

17.86

18

64.29

1976/77
n=28

3

10.71

9

32.14

16

57.14

1977/78
n=28

4

14.29

4

14.29

20

71.43

1978/79
n=28

5

17.86

6

21.43

17

60.71

TOTAL
n=168

24

MEAN
PERCENTAGE

98

46

14.29

27.38

58.33
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reveals that the degree of incrementalism varies somewhat according to
the type of expenditures.

The budgetary process for both salaries and

general expenditures is represented by either "incremental" or "rela
tively incremental" processes, while the process for other expendi
tures and projects can be characterized as a purely "non-incremental
process."
2.

The Existence of Supplemental Budgeting
Since the existence of supplemental budgets implies the lack of

an organization's capability to anticipate their short run needs, the
second test investigated this indicator for each fiscal year.
Hypothesis No. 2 stated that supplemental budgeting is a char
acteristic of the budgetary process of Saudi Arabian non-defence
agencies as evidenced by the existence of supplementary budget in the
majority ( 50%) of the agencies for the majority ( 50%) of the fiscal
years studied.
In order to test this hypothesis, Table 4 shows the number and
percentage of agencies which had or did not have a supplemental budget
for each fiscal year.

The data indicated that the majority of the

government agencies engaged in supplemental budgeting during each of
the six years studied. Specifically, 60.26 percent (94 cases) of the
156 cases had a supplemental budget during the period of the study,
while 39.74 percent did not.

The results in Table 4 are consistent

with a budgetary process characterized by frequent supplemental budgets.
The quantitative data did not suggest reasons for this result.
However, the interview results revealed additional insight.

The inter

view data indicated that most of the agencies engaged in supplemental
budgets in spite of the agencies' low spending efficiencies. The vast
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TABLE 4. SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGETS FOR ALL NON-DEFENSE AGENCIES FOR THE
FY 1979/1974 - FY 1978/1979

SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET
FISCAL

Agencies with
Supplemental
Budgets

Agencies Without
Supplemental
Budgets

YEARS
N

%

N

1973-1974
n=26

19

73.08

7

26.29

1974-1975
n=26

18

69.23

8

30.77

1975-1976
n=26

17

65.38

9

34.62

1976-1977
n=26

15

57.69

11

42.31

1977-1978
n=26

15

57.69

11

42.31

1978-1979
n=26

10

38.46

16

61.54

MEANS

94

60.26

62

39.74

n=156

t
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majority of the participants attributed this practice to the project
cost estimation and execution.

The lack of clarified criteria for

cost estimation, ill-qualified personnel, and an insufficient account
ing and feedback system led the agencies to over- or underestimate the
cost of their projects.

Overestimation creates the low spending effi

ciency, while the underestimation creates the supplemental budget.
The economic wealth in Saudi Arabia makes the budgetary process
different from that in underdeveloped countries.

In case of delay in

project execution or underestimation of cost, the agencies systematic
ally go to the Ministry of Finance for a supplemental budget.

Limita

tion, in economic resources in poor countries necessarily restrain
such a practice.
3.

The Relationships Among the Participants in the Budgetary
Process
The next series of tests investigate the relationships between

the budgetary participants in the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary
process.

In particular the relationships between budget expansion

(a dependent variable) and agency acquisitiveness, Ministry of Finance
support, estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion, and
spending efficiency (as independent variables) are investigated. The
dependent variable and the independent variables are operationally
defined in Chapter III.
Simple correlation was used to evaluate the significance of
each independent variable.
agency.

This analysis was performed for each

The agencies were then grouped by type, and simple correla

tion was utilized to measure the significance of each independent
variable for each type.

Additionally, step-wise regression procedures
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were performed to select the "best" independent variable(s) in explainint the variation in the dependent variable.
1.

Simple Correlation Analysis
A.

Single Agency Analysis
As shown in Tables 5A - 5E, agency acquisitiveness and

Ministry of Finance support play a major role in the budgetary
process.

The correlation between the Ministry of Finance support

and budget expansion was significant for the majority of the
government agencies.

Specifically, the simple correlations

between the Ministry of Finance support and budget expansion
were significant for 69 percent (18 agencies) at .01 level.

For

only two agencies the correlation between the Ministry of Finance
support and budget expansion was not significant at .10 level.
Tables 5A - 5E show that there was significant correlation
between agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion.

In parti

cular, the correlations between these two variables were signi
ficant in 4 agencies at .01 level.

The correlation between

agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion was not significant
at .10 level in 15 agencies. However, the values of these corre
lations were in the range of moderate correlation.
The findings in Tables 5A - 5E reveal that the relation
ships between Ministry of Finance support and budget expansion
were stronger than the relationships between agency acquisitive
ness and budget expansion.

Specifically, the average simple

correlation between Ministry of Finance support and budget expan
sion was .87 and between agency acquisitiveness and budget expan
sion was .65.

Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance seems

-N

J.
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TABLE 5A.

CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT,
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION,
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES).
"ECONOMIC RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT"

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
AGENCY
AA

MFS

ERE

ARE

Agency #1

.046

Agency #2

.981*

.001

.091

.063

.167

.949*

-.540

-.467

-.547

Agency #3

.401

.532

-.399

.111

-.236

Agency #4

.570

.968*

.037

.276

-.455

Economic
Resource
Development
#•

.557

.981*

-.057

.184

-.458

Significant at .01 level

SE

119
TABLE 5B.

CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT,
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION,
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES).
"HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT"

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
AGENCY
AA

MFS

Agency #5

.935*

Agency #6

SE

ERE

ARE

, 995*

-.078

-.091

.341

.706

.983*

.512

.345

-.310

Agency #7

.633

.964*

.604

.260

.050

Agency #8

.680

.853**

.723 T

,376

.528

Human
Resource
Development

,925*

.996*

.049

*

Aft
T

Significant at .01 level
Significant at .05 level
Significant at .10 level

-.007

.092
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TABLE 5C.

CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT,
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION,
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES).
"SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT"

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
AGENCY
AA

MFS

ERE

ARE

SE

Agency it9

.584

,810 T

-.746

-.263

-.289

Agency #10

.973*

.976*

-.141

-.191

>4]2

Agency #11

.963*

.982*

-.181

-.358

.264

Agency #12

-.342

.998*

.950*

.598

.090

Agency #13

.820**

.999*

.221

.083

.249

Agency #14

.878**

.897*

.274

.132

-.232

Social and
Cultural
Development

.643

.994*

.399

.212

.265

*
**
T

Significant at .01 level
Significant at .05 level
Significant at .10 level
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TABLE 5D.

CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT,
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION,
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES).
"PHYSICAL INFRASTRACTION DEVELOPMENT"

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
AGENCY
AA

MFS

Agency #15

.650

.987*

Agency #16

.837**

Agency #17

SE

ERE

ARE

.220

.423

.175

.429

-.264

-.271

.600

.859**

.948*

-.310

.050

-.416

Agency #18

.397

.954*

.373

.021

.349

Agency #19

.827**

.998*

.204

.231

-.199

Agency #20

.614

.879**

.583

.227

.173

.997*

.117

.262

-.009

Physical
,952*
Infrastraction
Development

*
**

Significant at .01 level
Significant at .05 level
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TABLE 5E.

CORRELATION BETWEEN BUDGET EXPANSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
AND AGENCY ACQUISITIVENESS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE SUPPORT,
ESTIMATED REVENUE EXPANSION, ACTUAL REVENUE EXPANSION,
AND SPENDING EFFICIENCY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES).
"ADMINISTRATIVE AND SERVICES"

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
AVjEiiNUX
AA

MFS

ERE

ARE

SE

.594

.366

.212

Agency #21

.608

.890**

Agency #22

.949*

.937*

-.156

-.435

.583

Agency #23

.703

.905*

.419

.312

.213

Agency #24

.616

.827**

.579

.620

.472

Agency #25

.891**

.977*

-.005

-.214

-.168

Agency #26

.872**

.846**

.084

-.074

-.027

Administrative
and Services .924*

.973*

.056

.108

.281

All Agencies .906*

.987*

.361

.257

-.333

*
**

Significant at .01 level
Significant at .05 level
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to influence the output of the final budgetary decisions more
than individual agencies did.
The results in Tables 5A - 5E also indicate that there
were no significant correlations between budget expansion and
the other independent variables.

The correlation between esti

mated revenue expansion and budget expansion ranged from a low
of -.005 to a high of .950.

In only 2 agencies was the corre

lation between estimated revenue expansion and budget expansion
significant at .10 level.

The correlations between actual

revenue expansion and budget expansion was not significant at
.10 level. The correlations ranged as low as -.007 and as high
as .62. Moreover, the spending efficiency was not significant
at .10 level for any of the agencies in the study sample.
In summary, the single agency analysis shows that a signi
ficant correlation existed between budget expansion and agency
acquisitiveness and between budget expansion and Ministry of
Finance support. However, the correlation between budget expan
sion and Ministry of Finance support was stronger than between
budget expansion and agency acquisitiveness.

Moreover, there

were no significant correlations between budget expansion and
estimated revenue expansion, between budget expansion and actual
revenue expansion, and between spending efficiency and budget
expansion (the other independent variables).

These findings

indicate that both Ministry of Finance and individual agencies
play major roles in the budgetary process; however, the Minis
try of Finance seems to influence the output of the final bud
getary decisions more than individual agencies.
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B.

Aggregate Data Analysis
As displayed in Table 5E, Ministry of Finance support and

agency acquisitiveness played a major role in the budgetary
process.

For the entire period examined, the simple correlation

between agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion was .90 and
between the Ministry of Finance support and the budget expansion
was .98; each was significant at the .01 level. The aggregate
data analysis reveals that both the Ministry of Finance and the
government agencies influenced the budgetary output.
The data in Tables 5A - 5E indicate that the simple corre
lations between the Ministry of Finance support and budget
expansion did not vary considerably upon the grouping agencies
by types of services.

In fact, the correlation between Ministry

of Finance support and budgetary expansion was significant at
the .01 level in all agency types.
The correlation between agency acquisitiveness and budget
expansion relatively varied from one type to another.

This

correlation was significant at .01 level in human resource
development, physical infrastraction development, and adminis
trative and service types (.925, .952, and .924, respectively).
The correlation was not significant in economic resource devel
opment and social and cultural development at .10 level (.557
and .643, respectively).
Tables 5A - 5E also show that a stronger correlation
exists between Ministry of Finance support and budget expansion
than between agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion.
Among all the agency types, the correlation between the Ministry
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cf Finance support and budget expansion was stronger than
between budget acquisitiveness and budget expansion.
In summary, the aggregate data analysis shows that both
the Ministry of Finance and the individual agencies (agency
acquisitiveness) influenced the budgetary outputs.

The role

of the Ministry of Finance did not vary upon grouping agencies
by type of services.

However, the role of agencies varied from

one type to another.

Also, the Ministry of Finance seemed to

influence the budgetary output more than agency acquisitiveness
did.

In addition, estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue

expansion, and spending efficiency were not significantly
correlated with budget expansion.
II.

Step-wise Multiple Regression Analysis
Regression analysis was used to make inference concerning the

factor(s) that affect Saudi Arabian budget expansion.

Step-wise multiple

regression procedures were used to select statistically the independent
variable(s) that significantly explain the variations in the dependent
variable.

The selection procedures were based on the t- statistics for

2
the regression coefficient and on the maximation of the R .
Step-wise regression results for each fiscal year - crosssectional analysis - are displayed in Table 6.

As shown, the following

results were observed:
1.

Fiscal Year 1973/1974.

The interaction of both Ministry

of Finance support and spending efficiency explained 64 percent
2

of the variations in budget expansion (R
.072, respectively.

changes = .570 and

F was significant at .01 level).

T-

statistics for the regression coefficient of both variables were

TABLE 6. THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGET EXPANSION - STEP-WISE REGRESSION RESULTS
FISCAL YEAR
INTERCEPT
1973-1974
Regression Coefficient
t Value
R^ Change
1974-1975
Regression Coefficient
t Value
R^ Change
1975-1976
Regression Coefficient
t Value
R^ Change
1976-1977
Regreesion Coefficient
t Value
r2 Change
1977-1978
Regression Coefficient
t Value
R^ Change

48.337

-2.519

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
MFS
AA
ERE
.062
.70

-17.879

SE

.008

.947
5.33*
.570

.106
1.30
.006

1.004
15.59*
.925

.931

.617
.87
.031

.031

.75

.863
4.85*
.632

.694

26.06*

.541

13.56*

147.938

-1.353

ARE

F
VALUE

.193
2.15**
.052

1.064
5.02*
4.98

1978-1979
Regression Coefficient
1.005
27.409
10.46*
t Value
.813
R^ Change
** Significant at .05 level
* Significant at .01 level

-.652

.650

13.61*

154.51*

-2.08**

.072

.324
1.52+
043

-.190
.827
54.85*
1.37
.014
+ Significant at .10 level
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significant at .01 level.
2.

Fiscal Year 1974/1975. Ministry of Finance support explain-

ed 93 percent of the variations in budget expansion (R

2

= .925,

F was significant at .01 level), t- statistics for the regres
sion coefficient were significant at .01 level.
3.

Fiscal Year 1975/1976. Ministry of Finance support explain

ed only 3 percent of the variation in budget expansion.
the independent variables were significant at .10 level.

None of
F-

was not significant at .10 level.
4.

Fiscal Year 1976/1977.

The interaction of both agency

acquisitiveness and Ministry of Finance support explained 69
percent of the variation in budget expansion (R

2

changes = .062

and .632, respectively, F was significant at .01 level),

t-

statistics for the regression coefficient of agency acquisitive
ness was significant at .05 level and the t- statistic for the
regression coefficient of agency acquisitiveness was signifi
cant at .01 level.
5.

Fiscal Year 1977/1978.

The interaction of both Ministry

of Finance support and spending efficiency explained 54 percent
2

of the variations in budget expansion (R

changes = .498 and

.043, respectively, F value was significant at .01 level). The
t- statistic for the regression coefficient of the Ministry of
Finance support was significant at .01 level, and the t- statis
tic for the regression coefficient of agency acquisitiveness
was significant at .10 level.
6.

Fiscal Year 1978/1979.

Ministry of Finance support ex

plained 81 percent of the variations in budget expansion
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2
(R = .813, F was significant at .01 level). The t statistics
for the regression coefficient was significant at .01 level.
The above findings indicate that Ministry of Finance support is
the dominant independent variable, explaining most of the variation in
budget expansion.

However, the interaction of both Ministry of Finance

support and spending efficiency increased the correlation with budget
expansion in two fiscal years.

Moreover, the interaction of both

Ministry of Finance and agency acquisitiveness increased the correla
tion with budget expansion in one fiscal year.

Therefore, spending

efficiency and agency acquisitiveness are contributing influences to
the primary factor, Ministry of Finance support, in explaining the
variation in budget expansion in the Saudi Arabian budgetary process.
Conclusions
Based on the quantitative budgetary data analysis, the following
conclusions were reached:
(1)

The saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process can be charac

terized as a "non-incremental process."

However, the degree of incre-

mentalism varies according to the type of expenditures.

The budgetary

process for both salaries and general expenditures are consistent with
an "incremental or "relatively incremental process," while the process
for both other expenditures and projects could be characterized as
"non-incremental Process."
(2)

The majority of the Saudi Arabian government agencies engaged

in supplemental budgeting during each of the six fiscal years studied.
(3)

Significant positive correlations were found between budget

expansion (the dependent variable) and agency acquisitiveness, as well
as between budget expansion and Ministry of Finance support.
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(4)

A stronger positive correlation was found between budget expan

sion and Ministry of Finance support than between budget expansion and
agency acquisitiveness.
(5)

A significant correlation was not found between budget expan

sion and estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion and
spending efficiency.
(6)

Ministry of Finance support was found to be the dominant inde

pendent variable that explained most of the variation in budget expan
sion.

Thus, the Ministry of Finance seemed to influence the output of

the final budgetary decision more than any other factor.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary
As reflected by the literature, the environment of each country
influences the budgetary process in that country.
which shape this environment are:

Often-cited factors

economic wealth, financial predict

ability, political institutions, elite values, and size.

Economic

wealth and financial predictability are considered the most powerful
factors.

Economic wealth refers to the availability of resources with

which to finance the budgetary goals.

Rich countries are those with

economic wealth sufficient to finance needed programs.
have precisely the opposite conditions.

Poor countries

Financial predictability refers

to the ability to anticipate flow of available resources in relation to
spending commitments.

Certain countries have the ability to calculate

the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past
and to project them into the near future.^

The per capita gross

national product was used to distinguish between rich and poor count
ries, a poor country being one with a low per capita gross national
product relative to per capita GNP in most Western European countries
and the United States.

In uncertain budgetary environments future

revenue and/or expenditures cannot be forecast with much probability

"Hlildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
Processes, pp. 10-13.
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of occurrence.

Financial predictability is a relative concept.

How

ever, uncertain budgetary environments are similar in several respects,
including lack of sufficient information, shortage in qualified human
resources, lack of diversification of sources of revenues, and lack of
administrative capability.
Economic wealth and financial predictability permit four classi
fications of budgetary environments, namely: rich and certain; poor
and certain; poor and uncertain; and rich and uncertain environments.
The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan are examples
of countries with rich and certain environments. Poor and certain
environments exist in American cities, where the budgetary process is
certain with respect to financial predictability but poor with respect
to economic wealth.

Poor and uncertain environments exist in most of

the underdeveloped countries.

Each of these three classes of budgetary

environments has been investigated in the existing literature.

Their

common characteristics have been identified, and the major behavioral
differences among their budgetary participants have been outlined.
However, the budgetary process in rich and uncertain environments has
never been investigated.

One authority explains:

"Budgetary process falling the rich and
uncertain box will not be discussed....because
I have not been able to find accounts of contem
porary governments with these characteristics.
Saudi Arabia is in fact a government with both wealth and
environmental uncertainty, and therefore fits in the fourth classifica
tion.

In Saudi Arabia, the per capita gross national product is on the

2Ibid.,

p. 11.
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same level as previously mentioned rich countries (1980 gross national
3

product per capita was estimated to be $15,700).
Arabia's current income is high.

However, Saudi

Rather than the result of manufac

turing and industry, this income is results from an inexpensive trans
fer of capital in the form of oil into capital, in the form of money.
In addition, the Saudi Arabian agencies are not able to calculate
expenditures in the recent past nor project them into the near future.
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to examine empirically the
characteristics of the government budgetary process in which the envi
ronment is uncertain but where the government is rich.
The study was carried out in four major phases.
First, the theory that exists to explain the governmental
budgetary process in any country regardless of the existing government
within that country is examined.
Second, the characteristics of budgetary processes in the first
three classes of budgetary environments (Rich/Certain, Poor/Certain,
and Poor/Uncertain) are reviewed.
Third, the characteristics of the budgetary process in rich and
uncertain environment are examined empirically.
several stages.

This phase involves

The role perceptions of the major participants in the

Saudi Arabian government budgetary process are analyzed; the charac
teristics of the country's governmental budgetary processes are empir
ically examined; and preliminary recommendations for the improvement of
the country's governmental budgetary process are developed.
3
U. S. Department of State, Foreign Economic Trends and Their
Implications for the United States, International Marketing Informa
tion Series, Number 79 - 150, p. 2.
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Finally, the characteristics of the budgetary processes in rich
and uncertain environments are compared with the other three classes
of the budgetary environments.
Since no previous study has been conducted to investigate the
budgetary process in rich and certain environments, the reliance on a
single research method to examine the budgetary process in this
environment was unavailable.

Therefore, a combination of different

research methods were used to gather the relevant data for this study.
This combination included library research, interviews, and empiricial
testing of the quantitative budgetary data.

In particular, open-end

interviews were conducted with 47 budgetary participants.

The objec

tives of the open-end interviews were twofold, nr.mely: (1) to provide
adequate knowledge (or a descriptive picture) of the Saudi Arabian
governmental budgetary process, and (2) to describe and analyze the
role perception of the participants in the budgetary process.

The

result of these interviews were reported in Chapter III.
The characteristics of the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary
process and the relationships among the budgetary participants were
investigated through analyzing quantitative budgetary data.

Data from

26 selected agencies over a period of six years (FY 1973/1974 through
FY 1978/1979) were collected and analyzed.

Three steps were used,

namely:
(1)

Testing the degree of incrementalism in the process by employ

ing the magnitude of changes in budgetary allocations.
(2)

Examining the capability of the government agencies in antici

pating their short run needs by analyzing the number and percentage
of agencies that engaged in supplemental budgeting.

•K..
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(3)

Investigating the relationships between budget expansion (the

dependent variables) and Ministry of Finance support, agency acquisi
tiveness, estimated revenue expansion, actual revenue expansion, and
spending efficiency (the independent variables) by employing the sta
tistical tools of simple correlations, regression analysis, and step
wise multiple regression procedures. The data were analyzed for each
of the 26 agencies, for the six fiscal years (cross-sectional analy
sis), and for type of agency.

The results of these analyses are

reported in Chapter III.
Consolidation of the Study Conclusions
The evidence suggests that the Saudi Arabian governmental bud
getary process can be characterized as a non-incremental process.
Specifically, the interview results showed that complexity in calcula
tions was a common attribute throughout the budgetary process.

The

determination of the projects' priorities and the estimation of their
cost, as well as the numerous problems in projects' execution, were
determined to be the major causes of this complexity.
The complexity in calculation led most of the government agencies
to either over- or underestimate their requests, thus compelling the
Ministry of Finance to review the entire agency requests instead of
concentrating on the changes or the increments from last year's appro
priations. In addition, the dramatic changes in the country's economy
forced the Ministry of Finance to give less weight to last year's
appropriations and to review the budget on a yearly basis.

Hence,

most of the project decisions were non-incremental in nature.
Salaries and general expenditures were estimated on the basis
of actual needs and, more importantly, on the basis of previous year's

•*\J.
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appropriations.

Thus, the budgetary decision for these types concen

trated on the increment or the changes from previous year appropriations
and were incremental in nature.
The evidence from the quantitative budgetary data also supported
the above conclusions. The magnitude of changes in budgetary alloca
tions and actual expenditures for most of the cases studied were in the
range of "non-incremental" process.

However, the degree of increment-

alism varied according to the type of expenditures.

The budgetary

process for both salaries and general expenditures suggested incre
mental or relatively incremental process while the process both for
other expenditures and for projects was non-incremental in nature.
The results of both research tools showed that supplemental
budgeting was one of the major attributes of the Saudi Arabian budget
ary process.

The interview indicated that the government agencies

used these budgets extensively to overcome uncertainties in predicting
their future needs.

Economic wealth has contributed a great deal to

the existence of these budgets.

However, the agencies must justify

the needs for any changes in the original budget.

The quantitative

budgetary data also revealed that the majority of the government
agencies required supplemental budgets during each of the six years
surveyed.
The interview results showed that the lack of skilled and highly
trained professionals was the rule, not the exception, among the
government agencies. However, this problem did not exist in the
budget department of the Ministry of Finance.

This department did

face, however, shortage in the number of staff.

Both problems con

tributed to the absence of innovations in the budgetary process.

-K

J
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The budgetary process suffered substantially from the lack of
well-defined decision criteria.

This problem led most of the govern

ment agencies to over- or underestimate their requests.

In fact, the

vast majority of the participants called for clarifying the decision
criteria.

However, extensive efforts have been devoted throughout

the entire government organization since the 1970's in overcoming this
problem.

The Five-Years Development Plan was actually a step in that

direction.

Also, the numerous directives issued by the Ministry of

Finance lessened the degree of this problem.
The absence of modern data-gathering and data-reporting tech
niques was observed throughout the budgetary process.

The existing

accounting and budgeting system are not sufficient to provide the
necessary feedback information.
The results of both research tools revealed that spending
agencies and the Ministry of Finance played major roles in the budget
output decisions.

However, the Ministry of Finance seemed to influ

ence the output of the final budget.
The interview results showed that the formulation cycle is a
coordinated effort of various government organizations.

The budget

or fiscal department at each agency is the primary place for develop
ing and orchestrating its proposed requests. However, both the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning play a major role in
this cycle.

The Ministry of Planning, through the FYDP, outlines the

agencies' general objectives, specifies the agencies' programs and
projects, and furnishes a rough estimate of the financial require
ments to execute these projects and programs.

The Ministry of Finance

has the sole responsibility for reviewing the agencies' proposed
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requests and making the final budgetary decisions.

However, the

Council of Ministers, as the main legislative body, has the power to
approve the country's annual budget.
The interview data revealed that the majority of the DBAs viewed
their role as "coordinator" among the agency's departments in formula
tion of both the agency's plans and annual budget request, rather than
ad "decision maker." Most of the agency budget decisions were made by
special committees in which the DBAs participated extensively.

In

contrast, the role of OBFs could be viewed as that of "cutter" more
than :efficiency economizer."

Most of the OBFs tended to cut the

agencies' requests, believing that they had exaggerated in their esti
mation.

The budgetary process showed a high level of strategizing.

Spending agencies tended to exaggerate their estimates, knowing that
the Ministry of Finance would alter their estimates.

This resulted in

utilizing formal and informal contacts by both the agencies' represent
atives and the staff of the budget department to achieve mutual agree
ments.
The quantitative budgetary data seemed to support the inter
views' results concerning the relationships between the budgetary
participants.

Significant positive correlations were found between

budget expansion and both agency acquisitiveness and Ministry of
Finance support.

The correlations between budget expansion and

Ministry of Finance support was stronger than the correlations between
budget expansion and agency acquisitiveness.

Moreover, there were no

significant correlations among budget expansion and estimated revenue
expansion, actual revenue expansion, and spending efficiency.

Since

the Ministry of Planning has a major influence on agency acquisitiveness,
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the simple correlation indicated that these three organizations affect
ed the final budgetary output. However, the multiple regression analy
sis showed that the Ministry of Finance support was the independent
variable that explained most of the variation in budget expenditure.
The final objective of this study is to compare its conclusions
with the research findings in other budgetary environments.

These

comparisons are limited to the characteristics of the budgetary proess, frequency of strategic maneuvers, and the degree of complexity in
calculations.

Figure 7 displays a summary of the characteristics of

the budgetary process, frequency of the strategic maneuvers, and the
degree of complexity in calculations for the three classes of budget
ary environments (rich and certain, poor and certain, and poor and
4
uncertain) and their counterparts in the Saudi Arabian governmental
budgetary process.
"Rich and certain environment" refers to a budgetary system
which has the ability to mobilize sufficient resources or to control
expenditures, or both, and which has the ability to calculate the flow
of expenditures or revenues, or both, in the immediate past and to
project them into the near future.

The budgetary processes in the

United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany are examples of
this budgetary environment.

The budgetary process in these countries

classified as rich and certain is incremental. Past decisions serve
as bases from which future expenditures are determined, and the budget
ary processes are concerned with adding or subtracting a small percent
age (increment) to or from the existing base.
4
Wildavsky, Budgeting:
Process, pp. 5-231.

A Comparative Theory of Budgetary

Figure 7.

Summary of the Characteristics of the Budgetary Processes, Frequency of the Strategic Maneuvers,
and the Degree of Complexity in the Calculation for the Three Classes of Budgetary Environments,
and Their Counterparts in the Saudi Arabian Governmental Budgetary Process.
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"Poor and certain environment" refers to a budgetary system
which is unable to mobilize sufficient resources (because of the lack
of which is unable to mobilize sufficient resources (because of the
lack of resources) or to control expenditures, or both, but which has
the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both,
in the immediate past and to project them into the near future.

The

budgetary process in most American city governments is the best example
of this budgetary environment.

Most American cities are in a poor -

resources position, but they have significant financial predictability.
The budgetary process in this environment becomes a whole revenue
control - orientation due to the poor resource position.

City offi

cials are aware of the needs of the city, but they must compromise
their needs considerably in the fact of limited resources.

So, the

budgeting process in the poor and uncertain environment is revenue
oriented because income determines expenditures.
"Poor and uncertain environment" refers to a budgetary system
which is unable to mobilize sufficient resources (because of the lack
of resources) or to control

expenditures, or both, and which is

unable to calculate the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both, in
the immediate past and to project them into the near future.

The bud

getary process in India, Pakistan, Egypt, and other poor countries is
an example of this budgetary environment.

The poor and uncertain

nations employ a budgetary process of repetition. Poverty leads them
to delay expenditures to ensure that their financial resources are
not depleted, whereas uncertainty causes them to reprogram funds
repeatedly in order to adjust to rapidly changing conditions.

So, the

budgetary process in poor and uncertain environments can be characterized
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as repetitive budgeting.
"Rich and uncertain environment" refers to a budgeting system
which has the ability to mobilize sufficient resources but which is
unable to calculate the flow of expenditures or revenues, or both, in
the immediate past and to project them into the near future.

The

budgetary process in Saudi Arabia is a prime example of this budgetary
environment.

This category seems to be a paradox since certainty is

usually a result of wealth. However, this researcher believes that
Saudi Arabia is a country which occupies this unique position.

Saudi

Arabia does not possess the productive factors of manufacturing, agri
culture, and banking, which make the United States, The United Kingdom,
and France wealth countries.

However, Saudi Arabia has a high current

income, which, according to the operational definition of economic
wealth, makes Saudi Arabia a wealth country (GNP per capita is approx
imately $15,700).

So, Saudi Arabia possesses the financial resources,

but does not have the ability to calculate the flow of expenditures in
the immediate past nor to project them into the near future.

The

results show that the government agencies spent an average of 61 per
cent of their original appropriation during the period of the study.
Therefore, the characteristics of the budgetary process in Saudi
Arabia differ from those in poor countries (those without money) and
in rich countries which are certain about their budgets.
The interview results and the quantitative budgetary data pro
vided ample evidence that the budgetary process of the Saudi Arabian
government is a non-incremental process combined with supplemental
budgeting. Both Saudi Arabian and rich and certain countries share the
common attribute of economic wealth; however, the budgetary process of
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Saudi Arabia differs from these countries due to uncertainty in calcu
lating the flow of expenditures in the immediate past and in projecting
them into the near future.

The past decisions in rich and certain

countries serve as bases from which future expenditures are determined
arid budgetary processes are concerned with adding or subtracting a
small percentage (increment) to or from the existing base.

By contrast,

both spending agencies and the Ministry of Finance in Saudi Arabia do
not rely heavily on past decisions as bases from which future expendi
tures are determined especially for projects expenditures.

In fact,

uncertainty leads both groups to reevaluate the whole government budget
on a year to year basis instead of concentrating on only the changes
from the last decision.
The budgetary process in Saudi Arabia is different from those of
poor and uncertain countries.

Both share the uncertainty factor.

and uncertain countries employ repetitive budgeting.

Poor

Poverty leads

them to delay expenditures to ensure that their financial resources are
not depleted, where uncertainty causes them to reprogram funds repeated
ly in order to adjust to rapidly changing conditions.

By contrast,

economic wealth in Saudi Arabia extenuates the uncertainty in the
budgetary process.

Spending agencies engage in supplemental budgeting

to cover any shortage in the original funds.

Also, the Ministry of

Finance utilizes the cumulative wealth to overcome revenue shortages.
Poverty in poor and uncertain countries disallows such practice.
The budgetary strategies are most used in poor and uncertain
environments.

The existing poverty and uncertainty .increase the

strategic maneuvers among the budget participants.

The reason for this

phenomenon is that the administrative agencies are not sure of their
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needs, and at the same time, the control organ does not have the
financial capability to grant the agencies' requests; hence, the
administrative agencies tend to exaggerate their requests, knowing in
advance that they will be substantially

altered by the control organ.

The administrative agencies in poor and uncertain environments
frequently utilize strategic maneuvers in order to survive, and the
control organ uses severe and erratic reductions due to the uncertainty
about future funds.
The participants in rich and certain environments use modest
amounts of strategic activities.

In this environment the resources are

abundant, but the ways and means of requesting and appropriating speci
fic funds are limited by sharply held expectations of desirable conduct.
The relationships between the administrative agencies and the control
organ in this environment are highly determined and gross departures
from this expectation are easy to discover.

So, the budget partici

pants in this environment do not rely heavily on strategic maneuvers.
Budgetary strategies are used least in poor and certain environ
ment. Due to the lack of resources and certainty in predicting future
funds, the budgetary relationships among participants are highly pre
dictable.

Any departure from this pre-determined relationship is easy

to discover.

So, the budget participants in this environment use

4

strategic maneuvers less than any other environment.

The participants in a Saudi Arabia budgetary process use a high
level of strategic activities. However, the frquency of strategic
maneuvers is less than in poor and uncertain countries and higher than

^Ibid.
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in both rich and certain and poor and uncertain environments.

The

budgetary participants in rich and certain and poor and uncertain
environments do not rely heavily on strategic maneuvers since the
relationships between the participants are highly determined and any
gross departures from this expectation are easy to discover.

In con

trast, uncertainty compels the spending agencies in Saudi Arabia to
exaggerate their requests, and also compels the Ministry of Finance to
cut these requests.

Both use formal and informal contacts in order to

arrive at mutual agreements - without relying on well defined objec
tives and criteria.

Moreover, uncertainty increases the frequency of

strategic maneuvers, as in poor and uncertain countries, but the
economic wealth reduces the level of those activities among the parti
cipants in Saudi Arabian budgetary process,

Spending agencies can be

satisfied with their original appropriation since they can ask for a
supplemental appropriation to cover any unforeseen conditions.
Poverty in poor uncertain countries prohibits such practice.
In those countries, spending agencies utilize strategic maneuvers in
order to survive.
the lack of funds.

The control organ uses strategic maneuvers due to
The poor and uncertain environment has the most

complicated budgetary process of all environments.

Poverty and uncer

tainty in this environment make it difficult for the budget participant
to predict next year's budget, so the budget becomes meaningless'.

Any

one financial year is likely to be quite different from last or next
year's budget in terms of revenue, expenditures, foreign aid, or infla
tion; hence, the budgetary process in this environment becomes very
complex in calculating the budget, and most of the time it is arbitrary.
Because of wealth and certainty, the budget process in rich and certain
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environment is the simplest in calculations compared to other environ
ments.

Rich and certain nations generally budget by increments (last

year's budget plus or minus a certain percentage).

So, the administra

tive agencies in these environments request certain funds with this
relationship in mind.

The control organ acts almost in the same manner.

Hence, the budgetary process is very simple compared to that in the
other environments.

The degree of complexity in the calculation in

poor and certain lies between these two extremes.

Certainty in this

environment creates simplicity in calculation, but poverty limits
change in the budget's original base."*
The calculation of the Saudi Arabian budget is a very complex
process.

Uncertainty makes it difficult for the budget participants

to predict next year's budget.

However, the degree of the complexity

is less than in poor and uncertain environments.

Economic wealth

decreases the degree of complexity since the government has the econo
mic leverage to overcome any mistake in calculation.
Recommendations
1.

Establishment of an independent budget department in all govern

ment organizations. The trend in the last decade to establish an
independent budget department in some agencies to formulate the agency's
plans and its annual requests is a step in the right direction.

How

ever, the researcher noticed that planning, budgeting, and accounting
matters in other agencies are still performed by one department,
namely:

The Fiscal Department Affairs. Thus, establishment of an

independent budget department in those agencies to carry the

5Ibid.
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responsibility of plans and request formulation is recommended. The
responsibilities of both the budget and the fiscal department must be
well defined.

Moreover, a channel of communications must be estab

lished between these two departments.
2.'

Establishment of a cost accounting unit in each budget depart

ment.

The study results indicated that the budgeting decision-making

process at the agency level suffered substantially from the lack of
the necessary feedback information.

In order to overcome this defi

ciency, a centralized cost accounting unit should be established with
in each budget department.

The main responsibility of this unit would

be to provide cost/benefit analysis to the decision maker and to
furnish monthly reports.

The cost accounting unit must utilize modern

data-gathering techniques and be equipped with modern data-processing
hardware, as well as being staffed with qualified personnel.

Further

more, a channel of communication should be established between this
unit and the fiscal department and the other agencies.
3.

Increase the formal and informal training of all levels of per

sonnel in each agency's budget and fiscal departments.

As mentioned

before, the absence of skilled and highly trained budgetary profes
sionals was the rule not the exception in all of those departments.
This problem has discouraged any budgetary innovations.

The budget

and fiscal departments must encourage their employees to participate
in the accounting and budget courses that are offered through the
countries universities and the Public Administration Institute.
4.

Increase the degree of linkage between the five-year develop

ment plans and the annual budget.

Concerning the annual budget, the

FYDP outlines the general objectives of each government organization,

•K.
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specifies the detailed projects and programs to achieve these objec
tives, and forecasts the financial requirements for these projects and
programs.

Officially, the FYDP furnishes the basic outlines for the

formulation of the country's annual budget.

However, the results of

the study suggested the difficulty of adherence to the plan in prepar
ing the annual budget.

The writer is not an advocate of introducing

PPBs or ZBBs into the Saudi Arabia governmentary process at this time;
however, increasing the linkage between the FYDP and budget preparation
is essential.
5.

Improvement of budget execution.

Wildavsky pointed out that

poor countries have common problems in budget execution, such as, delay
in project execution due to bad weather, delay in delivery of materials,
insufficient plans, ill-qualified personnel, and excessive paper work.
Due to the economic wealth in Saudi Arabia, the severity of
these problems is less than in poor countries.

However, uncertainty in

the Saudi Arabian governmental budgetary process leads most of the
government agencies to delay some of the planned projects, thus, increas
ing the degree of complexity of decision-making for the next year's
budget.
The last decade has witnessed extensive efforts by all government
agencies and organizations to improve budget execution.

These efforts

are steps in the right direction. However, more efforts are recommend
ed in order to decrease the degree of complexity of the decision-making
process.

These efforts may take any or all of the following paths:

£
Wildavsky, Budgeting:
Process, p. 149.
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(a) Increase of the responsibility of the Ministry of Public
Works and Housing to include control of all government projects
execution and preparation of monthly reports on the progress of
all government projects.
(b) Separation between the budgetary processes for recurrent
expenditures and project expenditures.
(c) Extension of the project budgetary cycles from their
present one-year cycle to a two-year cycle thereby allowing
more time for project decisions.
(d) Increase in the degree of cooperation among all government
organizations in project executions.
(e) Improvement of the financial and accounting guidelines.
6.

Establishment of a committee to study the government accounting

system.

This committee may be composed of the members of the profes

sional and academic communities.
7.

Establishment of well-defined decision criteria throughout all

the budget cycles.
8.

Improvement of the budget classifications. Due to the rapid

increase in government activities, relevant information is more essen
tial now than ever before; such information is not generated by the
traditional Saudi Arabian budgetary process.

Although the traditional

budget promotes "Accountability" by emphasizing the control over
administrative spending abuses, the traditional budget does not focus
upon budget output or the accomplishment of governmental goals.

The

government agencies are advised to focus on program, program
cost and program outputs in formulating their requests, instead of
focusing upon item cost.

In addition, the Ministry of Finance should

+v.
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review the budget on the basis of programs rather than line items.
This approach would be easy to accomplish in Saudi Arabia's govern
mental budgetary process since it is reviewed and approved in a
centralized fashion, in contrast to the process in countries where the
budget is reviewed and approved in fragmented fashion.
9.

Establishment of a cost accounting unit within the budget

department of the Ministry of Finance.

The responsibility of this unit

is to furnish basic feedback information to the budget reviewers.
10.

Increase the number of budget reviewers at the budget department

of the Ministry of Finance.

The study showed that this department,

unlike the budget department of the agencies, does not lack profession
al personnel.

However, it does have an inadequate number of personnel

to perform its functions in the required time span. The Ministry of
Finance is advised to make an extensive effort to hire additional
professionals.
11.

Improvements in audit procedures and reporting.

A committee

should be established to study the audit procedures and reporting.

As

an initial step, both the Ministry of Finance and the Audit. Bureau
should be encouraged to issue monthly reports in pre- and post-audit.
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OPEN-END INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

I.

The following questions will be asked of the various participants

in- the budgetary process.
-

To start with, would you give me a brief biographical sketch of
yourself?

Please include your educational and occupational back

ground.
-

What is your current position?
What is your role in the budgetary process?

II.

The following questions will be asked of the agency's budget

officials.
-

How does your agency go about drawing up its annual budgetary
request?
How many people and work hours are involved with the development
of your agency's request?
What criteria do you use in evaluating each departmental request?

-

How effective are these criteria?
What criteria do, you use to judge whether an item should be
included in your agency's request?

Why?

How effective are these criteria?
Are you formally or informally in contact with other agency
budget officers concerning your request?
*The open-end interview is adapted with some modifications from
Caputo, David Arman, The Normative and Empirical Implications of the
Budgetary Process of Four Medium-size Cities, unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, Yale University, 1970.
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-

What are the results of these contacts and how effective are
they?

-

After you have submitted your agency's request to the Budget
Department, what does your office do?

-

Are you formally or informally in contact with the Budget
Department's officers concerning your requests?

-

What effect do these contacts have on your subsequent request?
What criteria does the General Budget Department use to evaluate
your agency's request?

-

How effective are these criteria?

-

After the agency's budget is spproved, what does your office do?
During the execution stage, does your agency request supplement
ary funds?

-

If yes, why?

What criteria does the budget officer use to evaluate the supple
mentary request?
Are there any other items pertaining to the budgetary process
you feel are important, but which I have left out?
Finally, what suggestions do you think could improve the budget
process in Saudi Arabia?

III.

The following questions will be asked of the Budget Department
officials (Ministry of Finance).

-

How does the Budget Department go about reviewing the approving
each agency's annual budget?

-

How does the Budget Department go about reviewing and approving
the whole governmental budget?
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How many people and work hours are involved with the development
of the governmental budget?
What criteria does your office use in reviewing and approving
each agency's budget?
How effective are these criteria?
Does your office give equal treatment to all agencies' requests?
Why?
Does your office contact other agencies concerning their
requests?
What effect do these contacts have on the budget review and
approval?
After approving the governmental budget, what role does your
office have in the budget execution?
During the execution stage, does your office approve any supple
mentary funds to the agencies?

If yes, why?

What criteria does your office use to evaluate the supplementary
requests?
What suggestions do you think could improve the budgetary process
in Saudi Arabia?
Finally, are there any items pertaining to the budgetary process
you feel important, but which I have left out?

APPENDIX II
Open-End Interview Schedule
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